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1. Introduction 
Focus of the study
This thesis focuses on the European Union and the Cyprus conflict. The EU was from the 
early start a peace project with the aim to secure the European continent from disasters 
like the two World Wars. Through trade and cooperation the major states in Europe 
would become interdependent and more developed. Over the years, several countries in 
Europe joined the Union in their quest for wealth and prosperity. The EU uses 
conditionality on its candidate countries to promote democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law, and states in the periphery of Europe fight corruption and totalitarianism to meet 
EU standards. During the last decade the EU has grown and deepened. It has occurred an 
increasing institutionalization of relations between European states, where the states are 
bound together by legal agreements that constrain and condition policy choices. This is 
also happening across the traditional east- west line in Europe. The EU has successfully 
domesticated security within the union in the sense that it is extremely unlikely that 
member states would use military force to resolve conflicts with other member states. 
 The end of the Cold War marked a shift in security and foreign policy all over the 
world, something that led to a significant change in the understanding of what constitute 
threats to European security. After the Cold War there has been a shift from the almost 
exclusive focus on military threats from states and towards a focus on a number of highly 
diverse issues. These issues vary from economic and societal problems to terrorism, the 
spread of WMD, migration and ethnic conflicts.  
 One of the present EU members is Cyprus. It joined the EU on 1st of Mai 2004, 
together with nine other countries. The story behind this particular accession is somehow 
different, and perhaps more dramatic than the others. The island of Cyprus has been 
divided between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots since 1974, but troubles started 
much earlier. It got its independence from Great Britain in 1960 and the guarantors of the 
Constitution were Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. Along with the Turkish Cypriots, 
Greek Cypriots, the UN and the EU these are the key players in this long lasting and deep 
rooted ethnic conflict.  
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 This thesis will, however, deal with only a part of the overall conflict. The 
Republic of Cyprus (RoC, the southern part) applied for EU membership in 1990 and 
after that the EU became an important player in the conflict. Many researchers and 
politicians believed that the EU would work as a positive catalyst for peace, bringing 
with it enough incentive to make the parts involved agree. For a long time, settlement of 
the conflict was a pre-condition for accession of Cyprus. However, after the Luxembourg 
Summit in 1997, it became clear that after tremendous pressure from Greece this demand 
was no longer a fact. Even though only one part of Cyprus is present in the EU today it is 
interesting to look at the EU impact on several of the players in the conflict. Has the EU 
process led to any changes in northern Cyprus and in Turkey as well?   
 There have been many attempts to bring the two sides together and work towards 
a solution, which all have failed. The most prominent in this effort were led by the UN. 
After nerve-racking months with UN sponsored talks prior to the accession, the result 
became clear just days before the accession. On 24th of April 2004, both sides voted in 
referendums concerning a huge UN plan for settlement and reconciliation which also 
included EU membership for both sides. The people in north voted in favor of the plan, 
but the people in the south rejected it. The Republic of Cyprus, therefore, joined the EU 
on behalf of the whole island, with EU- laws and rules suspended in the north.   
 Northern Cyprus has a special place in this study. It is a side of the conflict that is 
rarely heard and which is marginalized in much of the world. It has for years been a 
“rogue state”, which has from the western point of view, including the EU, been the sole 
reason for the stalemate. Northern Cyprus unilaterally declared its own state in November 
1984, a state that is only recognized by Turkey. Turkey has been criticized for 
recognizing it and has for years considered it as a domestic part of Turkey. However, the 
situation has changed in both Turkey and Northern Cyprus in the last years and created a 
new type of conflict. Many studies have been made about how the nation state alters in 
relationship with the EU and how the EU has great influence when it comes to identity, 
politics and economy. Northern Cyprus is, however, not an internationally recognized 
nation state, but strives for membership and closer contact with Europe. This thesis will 
also look at this difficult relationship and how the EU has influenced the Turkish Cypriot 
position and view on settlement. 
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 Turkey is a key actor in today’s security picture both regarding the Cyprus 
conflict but also in a more general way in the Middle East. Turkey has been of vital 
importance for the US in the search for terrorists and the war against Iraq. The country is 
heavily interlinked with Iran, Iraq and Syria concerning the Kurds in the area. What 
happens now with the Kurds in Iraq will be of great importance for the Kurds in Turkey. 
It will also be of great importance for the EU. A Turkey with a developing democracy, 
good record with human rights and rule of law is very important to maintain and develop 
further in the troublesome region. However, Turkey is also important in the Cyprus 
conflict. Turkey is the only country that legitimizes the TRNC and has for many years 
treated it as a Turkish region. In the recent years the prospect for a Turkish EU 
membership has been optimistic which again has loosened the deadlock that has 
prevailed for the last 30 years. The political change in Turkey has also contributed to this. 
The present Prime Minister in Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has worked hard to 
convince the reluctant nationalist elite and the military about the importance of meeting 
the EU accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria). The Cyprus conflict is therefore vital to 
the future of Turkey. And the future of Turkey is vital to the future of EU. The EU is now 
in the border zone between east and west and the case of Turkey makes this even clearer.  
 
The research questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the EU impact on the Cyprus conflict. Has it 
contributed to peace and stability or has it on the contrary had little impact on the peace 
process? This can be specified in the following two questions:  
 
1. How has the EU influenced the different parts of the Cyprus conflict? 
2. How can this influence be explained? 
 
 
There are many parts involved in this conflict, and this thesis will only look at some of 
them. The main parts, which will be analyzed, are the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek 
Cypriots, as well as their motherlands, Turkey and Greece. However, there will be a 
special focus on the Turkish Cypriot and the Turkish side. As mentioned, Northern 
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Cyprus has been internationally isolated for many years, and the last settlement effort 
could have been a new start in a new world for them. Therefore it is especially interesting 
to look at EU impact in the north. How do people in the north view the EU? Another 
element which will be dealt with here is the role of the UN and how the EU framework 
was utilized in the last UN plan, the so-called “Annan Plan”.   
 One special feature about conflicts in general, which also suits the Cyprus 
conflict, is the question of security. Both sides are obsessed with it in their own way, and 
this thesis will also look at how the EU changes the perception of security within their 
framework. Theories from the constructivist Copenhagen School will be used to better 
understand difficult security issues after the Cold War.  
 The weakness of picking some actors is that others will be ruled out, and in this 
case there are several actors that I hardly mention. Both the U.S and the UK are also 
important players as well as the UN, which are probably the most important mediator and 
actor beside the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots themselves.  
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of six main chapters. In chapter two I will account for the 
methodology and methods used during the work with this thesis. It will reveal some 
features about qualitative method and case study method, but also important features 
about the fieldwork. The following theory chapter will frame my analysis with theories 
and concepts from integration theory, Europeanization theory and Security theory. 
Chapter four is a background chapter, which gives us important snapshots from the 
history. I find it important to have knowledge about the history of Cyprus, but also about 
Turkey and Greece. Their way of doing politics, for instance, has influenced the two 
communities on the island heavily. The next chapter will then be the main analysis 
chapter, and deal with the EU perspective on the Cyprus conflict as well as the overall 
impact from the EU on different parts of the conflict. Finally, I will sum up my findings 
in the Conclusion chapter. 
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2. Methods 
Introduction 
This chapter will reveal some of the most important elements of a master thesis. It will 
show how the work has been conducted and prove that the researcher have thought 
through positive and negative sides with his or her work. Every move needs an 
explanation and this chapter will reveal mine. I also want the reader to understand how 
my data has been collected and used. The reader can then more easily assess the thesis 
concerning reliability, validity and generalization and the researcher himself can reflect 
over his own work. Even though these concepts are mostly used in quantitative research, 
they are also important for qualitative work. Reliability tells us something about how 
reliable the results of the research are; while validity is about how well the data and the 
research design fits the main research questions. Generalization is about how this 
knowledge can be transferred to other situations (Thagaard 1998). This thesis is built 
upon qualitative methods only, and the nature of qualitative methods and case study will 
be dealt with in the first part. The next parts take a close look on the materials, which 
form the basis for this thesis. It will analyze the process of fieldwork and interviewing, 
document analysis and observation. 
 
Case study as a qualitative method 
According to Thagaard (1998) it is important that ones choice about method is in 
accordance with the theme and main research questions. This thesis will assess the impact 
the EU has had, and still have on the Cyprus conflict, and the tool I find most proper to 
use is qualitative methods. Qualitative methodologies explore the feelings, 
understandings and knowledge’s of others through interviews, discussions or participant 
observation (Limb and Dwyer 2001). This way of conducting research is increasingly 
used by human geographers to explore the complexity of the processes that shapes our 
social world. The extensive use of this methodology came as a protest to the “quantitative 
revolution” in the 1960s which used various quantitative methods to understand people’s 
sense of place (Limb and Dwyer 2001). By using qualitative methods, we do not start 
with the assumption that there is a pre-existing world that can be measured, but that the 
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social world is something dynamic and always changing. Qualitative methods are 
therefore characterized by an in-depth, intensive approach rather than an extensive or 
numerical approach (Limb and Dwyer 2001).  
 The case study method used here is one way of conducting qualitative research. 
According to Gomm et al. (2000) all research is case study, because there is always some 
unit that is analyzed. But they also manage to narrow down the term and make it suitable 
for this study about the Cyprus conflict. They argue that a case study method investigates 
a relatively small number of cases and that information is gathered and analyzed about a 
large number of features of each case. Yin (1989) states that case study method is a 
preferred method when the main research questions are “how” and “why”, when the 
phenomenon in the study is a contemporary one and when the researcher has little control 
over the events. These questions contribute to the exploring feature of the case study, 
where new and interesting research questions arise on the way. This exploring feature 
makes it easier to seize the complexity of meanings and events, which form the basis for 
a social phenomenon. Another feature about the case study design is the method 
triangulation. When working with a case, it is normal to use several methods to gather 
data, for example interviewing, observation and document analysis.  
 The case study approach has been criticized for not being able to generalize in the 
classic way. The classic form of generalization is to claim that what is the case in one 
place or time will be so elsewhere or in another time. In experimental or survey research, 
generalization claims are explicit and constitute the basis of scientific reasoning. 
However, in qualitative research, generalization claims are less explicit. Some social 
scientists even minimize the relevance of generalization or deny any intention toward 
generalization in qualitative research (Payne and Williams 2005). A case study does not 
tell us anything about the expansion of a social phenomenon within a limited universe of 
phenomenon. In fact, the purpose of a case study is to not generalize, but rather to 
“generalize to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes” (Yin 1989, 
21) However, Yin argues that there are another type of generalization that is more 
feasible on case study research which is called analytical generalization. This type of 
generalization is rather conclusions that are drawn from the case to develop new theories 
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and concepts. The conclusions made are therefore on a higher level of abstractions than 
in a classic generalization. 
 
Fieldwork 
 
Much of the basis for this thesis is from my experiences in Cyprus. The fieldwork lasted 
for one month, during the whole of November 2004. I stayed in the city of Gazi Magusa 
(Famagusta in Greek), which is situated in the north east of the island. The main reason 
why I chose this city is that The Eastern Mediterranean University is located there, with 
approximately 14 000 students. The University has students from all over the Middle East 
and Eastern Europe as well as Turkish Cypriots. During my stay, I conducted several 
interviews, read local newspapers, observed both people and important places and had 
many informal conversations.  
 Prior to the trip I contacted the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) for advice 
and help regarding informants in Cyprus. PRIO has local staff in Nicosia, which I 
contacted before leaving Norway. These were my key persons during my stay in Cyprus, 
and besides them I only had one interview organized prior to the trip. This interview was 
organized through a friend who lives in Cyprus. After my first interview with PRIO-
emloyees, many doors were opened, and I got in touch with the people I wanted to meet. 
During my stay I conducted in total 10 interviews and attended one seminar (appendix). 
The people I talked to were mainly high-ranking politicians or advisers, and political 
researchers.  
 When looking back on this experience, I find especially one weakness about the 
fieldwork. The theory used in this thesis was collected and read through after the 
fieldwork. In the aftermath, this should have been done prior to the trip. The theory is 
important and gives the researcher more knowledge and understanding and makes the 
important questions easier to find. I believe this decreased the validity of the data, since 
many of the questions asked were not answering my research questions well enough.  
This weakness can be related to both lack of experience as a researcher and lack of 
preparedness before the fieldwork. The same weakness can also be a result of the very 
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nature of the case study. Because of the exploring feature of the case study, the level of 
knowledge is low in the starting phase and will increase during the work. 
The interview situation 
Interviewing is a qualitative method, which brings with it great advantages, as well as 
challenges. Interviews are generally unstructured or semi-structured and work more as a 
dialogue than an interrogation (Valentine 1997). The aim of an interview is to understand 
how individual people experience their own life. The research interview is not only a new 
method that gives us qualitative data instead of quantitative ones, but it also reflects an 
alternative view on themes in social sciences. It reflects our thoughts about meaning, 
reality and the truths in social science (Kvale 2002). However, there are a lot of things to 
remember when conducting interviews and also ethical guidelines to follow. My own 
experience with these issues will be dealt with here. 
 Before leaving Norway, I made a semi structural interview guide to use in the 
field. The reason for making the guide semi-structural was to make the interviews as 
flexible as possible in my situation. A semi-structured interview lets the interviewees 
respond more freely and it allows conversation. It also made it easier for me to cross-
reference and verify my interpretation and understanding of the replies. It contained 
several topics and some specific questions. This guide was meant as a helping tool to get 
the open conversation started. Already at the first interview I noticed that several 
questions were outdated and not relevant enough. The questions that had meaning to me 
in front of my computer at home did not have the same meaning to other people.  Prior to 
the remaining interviews I therefore made new guides directly aimed at the persons I was 
meeting. As time went by, the guides were not used actively, but rather as a check list to 
ensure all the topics were covered. This is also the reason why this guide is not part of 
this thesis’ appendix.  
 I used a tape recorder during almost all of the interviews, something which was 
both positive and negative. In my opinion, this strengthened the reliability of the data by 
ensuring more reliable and trustworthy information. The main reason for me to use it was 
for me to pay more attention to what the informant was actually saying and try to follow 
up with good questions. My lack of experience with the interview-situation made it 
difficult to focus on the conversation and at the same time writes down the most 
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important points. Two of my interviews, however, showed me the more negative aspect 
of using tape recorder. Half way through the first interview I realized that the pause 
button was still on, so I only recorded the second half of the interview. Thinking it was 
recording, I did not pay enough attention and taking notes. After the interview I tried to 
sum up the most important points of the first half, but it was difficult and many important 
elements may have disappeared. During the next interviews I was very cautious about 
taping it the right way. Towards the end of the stay I had a similar experience with the 
tape recorder during an interview. I realized that the tape was empty a day later when I 
was going to transcribe it. This resulted in a very fragmented resume from what I 
recollected from the interview. Many important elements from the interview may also 
here have been lost. Further, I found it important to transcribe the interviews as accurate 
as possible, something which also further ensure the validity of the data. It is also 
important to remember that there are also no true, objective transformation from an oral 
to a written mode of communication since transcripts are decontextualised conversations 
(Kvale 2002).  
 Before I started the interviews I asked for permission to use the tape recorder, 
something everyone but one confirmed. My last informant gave me a negative answer to 
this request and I conducted the interview without the recorder. This put me in a different 
position from the other interviews, and I had to focus on both the conversation and my 
questions. Luckily, this interview was the last one, and I was then familiar both to 
professional and technical issues, so that interview actually became one of the best.  
 Prior to the trip I had thought about how to deal with an interview situation were I 
was a young blonde female student and in charge of a situation with mostly male Muslim 
powerful men. This was certainly the situation many times, but it never became a 
hindrance or a negative element. Rather, the informants were glad to talk to foreigners 
who take interest in their case and care about learning more. The overall feeling of the 
informants, especially the politicians, was frustration about little international attention 
for the conflict and about the Turkish Cypriot side. The Turkish Cypriot community is 
more secular than the Turkish mainland community and that gave me more confidence 
being in charge of the interview situation. I felt also uncertain how to behave towards 
high-politic persons, like the Prime Minister, but this interview was in the end of the 
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fieldwork, so my questions and insight in the topics were far more thought trough than in 
the beginning. Talking to politicians in general was no problem, since they are used to 
talk much, and during some interviews I barely got to ask a few questions. This situation 
also put me in a position where I could conduct research on a more neutral and objective 
basis than an insider. 
 While doing the research, the ethical considerations might be just as important as 
the technical ones, especially concerning interviewing. The ethical principles do not only 
concern the informant, but also the research itself, that it is scientific and independent 
(Kvale 2002). Prior to the trip, I had made “confidentiality agreements” for each 
informant about the absolute confidentiality of the conversation and question about 
quoting in the thesis. At each interview I felt very unease about bringing out the paper 
and thus making the situation more formal. This does not mean that the interviews were 
informal, but I felt that our oral promise about the matter was enough. The informants 
answered very clear on these questions and all but one was positive for later use of their 
words. Another ethical consideration is the possible consequences for the informants 
because of their attendance to the project. Prior to the trip I felt insecure about the 
negative effects it could cause to the people involved because of the sensitive topic. 
Northern Cyprus is, even though it is softening, still a military state with more than 
30 000 troops on the ground. The military are still controlling many areas, something 
which was easy to observe.  It was therefore a surprise when the openness and positivism 
about the topic was a fact with almost all the informants. This openness can be a sign of 
the emerging democracy and longing for international attention. They maybe considered 
the consequences to be more positive than negative, something in which I agree on. The 
Turkish Cypriot community need and should get more international attention. Even 
though the positive feed back, I have chosen to keep the informants anonymous during 
the whole thesis.   
 One can ask why there are no “ordinary people” in this survey, and why I only 
talked to well educated people. It was important to me to talk to persons who are activists 
in the conflict and who have knowledge about the present situation with the EU. All my 
informants could give me analyses and thoughts of why the situation is like it is today 
and why the EU did not work as the positive catalyst many thought it could be. However, 
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that does not mean that I did not talk to “ordinary people” about the conflict and the 
situation they are in. 
 Another problem with reliability in the interview situation is that the informants 
talk about experiences and happenings, which go long back in time. These memories will 
change with time, since we forget details or interpret the actions in new light than earlier. 
This is also a fact I must remember when analyzing the transcribed interviews. All my 
informants talked much about history and particularly events that occurred several years 
ago. The context in political Cyprus has shifted dramatically the last years and 
interpretations of prior events can easily change with them.  
 I think this whole experience has given me good training in how to handle the 
researcher situation, especially since this has been my own project from the start. 
Working with an organization or a larger group, I could not have acted so freely and 
independently as I have done. On the other hand, working alone also imply that I myself 
have to take all the choices and all the critique. The personal experience of being alone in 
a foreign country is also a great one, where barriers were stretched each day.  
 
Other sources of data 
During a case study, the researcher will improve the validity of the work by using 
multiple types of information sources, also called data triangulation (Yin 1989). In 
addition to the semi structured interviews, I also made use of secondary data, observation 
and informal conversations. Secondary data means information which has already been 
collected by someone else and is available for others to inspect (Clark 1997). The 
secondary data sources can be government surveys, censuses, administrative records, 
newspaper articles and diaries; in other words all material which are publicly available.  
 The aim of the analysis is to gather many documents about a certain subject and 
then compare them. When using many sources, one gets a broader picture of the 
phenomenon of interest (Clark 1997). Analyzing secondary data is challenging when 
studying conflicts, like the Cyprus conflict. There are many sides of all the stories and 
strong opinions and feelings are attached to it. It was therefore important from the 
beginning to use a wide variety of data sources, both primary and secondary ones. The 
secondary data sources are most important in this thesis, and include newspaper articles, 
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research papers and official documents mainly from the EU. With all these sources there 
is one important issue which Clark (1997) describes as “representativness”. Each 
newspaper has their own way of interpreting or seeing things, which is important for all 
readers to think about. When using such material in a master thesis it is extremely 
important to interpret the data well and do thoroughly background check on both the 
author and the newspaper itself. Double-checking the facts is also important. This will 
improve the reliability of the work. The newspapers I have used most often here are 
Turkish Daily News and The Guardian. The first one I found most difficult to use, 
because of my lack of knowledge about Turkey, at least prior to the fieldwork. 
Nevertheless, I found this source very important, both for use in the thesis, but also for 
filling my knowledge gaps about the topic seen from the Turkish side. The importance of 
interpretation became clear when using this source. Many of these articles were not 
suitable for joining my document analysis, but nevertheless gave a good overview about 
the citizen’s opinions. 
 One other important secondary data source used in the thesis is various research 
working papers. The working papers and research reports are from various peace research 
institutes like PRIO, SIPRI and COPRI (Peace Research Institutes in Oslo, Stockholm 
and Copenhagen), political journals like JEMIE (Journal on Ethno politics and Minority 
Issues in Europe) and reports from various Universities. Even though no data is objective, 
I found good help in these articles, which I regard as trustworthy and reliable. Another 
source is official documents from the EU homepage, which I used mainly to get hard 
facts about the EU accession process and strategies both towards Cyprus and Turkey.  
 
Observation and informal conversations 
To understand such a complex conflict better, it was vital for me to stay in Cyprus a 
month and learn not only through formal interviews, but also through visiting people in 
their homes and at work. The older men in Northern Cyprus spoke quite well English, 
since they lived during the colony era when everyone learned English. They were glad to 
talk to foreigners again and loved to talk about the troublesome history. The young 
people and the students did not speak that well English so it was hard to get into contact 
with them, but I had many conversations with other foreigners who stayed in Famagusta. 
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They gave me an outsider’s point of view on the situation and about the Turkish Cypriots, 
which was interesting. One learns much about a different culture just by observing and 
being curios. It was also important to see with my own eyes the border and the 
checkpoints, the military and all the “propaganda”. The two communities speak of each 
other in a way that I would refer to as propaganda, a word they probably would not use 
themselves. Northern Cyprus has been isolated since 1974 and it was also important for 
me to see the consequences of this. It has not only affected the economy and politics but 
also the mentality of the people. To better understand the conflict and how it has changed 
since the EU became a factor it was important to study all these aspects. A weakness of 
the observation method is the fact that events might happen differently due to the 
presence of the researcher (Yin 1989).  
 
Summary 
The method used in this work is qualitative method based on what Yin labels case study 
method. The reason for this choice depends on what design will fit the main research 
question best. In this case qualitative methods based on fieldwork and document analysis 
fits the research question the best. The fieldwork was conducted during November 2004 
where various activists in the conflict were interviewed (appendix). This raw material 
was transformed to text, which again was analyzed. Other secondary data sources were 
also analyzed and used either as background information or inside the text. When 
conducting fieldwork, but also during other stages in the research process, it is important 
to examine strength and weaknesses about the work to increase the validity and reliability 
of the work. In this chapter several such weaknesses and strength have been dealt with 
such as the low level of knowledge at the starting point in a case study research, but also 
challenges during the interview process. Being an “outsider” in a Muslim society is also 
discussed. There are also many important ethical aspects to think through, especially 
during fieldwork, such as confidentiality. This is a special important element since the 
case in focus is a rather tense identity conflict, and critical voices could imply sanctions 
for the persons involved. This was not a problem in this case, but the choice was 
nevertheless made to keep the informants anonymous.  
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3. Theory 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will introduce concepts and theories to frame this analysis. It will reveal 
ideas from integration theory, Europeanization theory and from security theory.  
Integration theory 
Theories about European integration are important to know to better understand how the 
EU has affected the Cyprus conflict, but also to gain better understanding of the EUs 
formal institutions. The European integration force has contributed much to the 
development of peace and prosperity in Europe after the Second World War, and the 
integration force also alters the political landscape and changes the nation states in its 
integration path. The theories dealt with here will try to explain some of these changes. 
 Integration theory is also important because “pure” empirical knowledge of how 
institutions work is impossible and thus not very meaningful. It is impossible because the 
representation of empirical facts is always based on assumptions and concerns which are 
often not reflected upon. Integration theory helps to highlight and problematize these 
assumptions and concerns (Wiener and Diez 2004).  
European integration made a huge leap forward on 1st of Mai 2004 when ten new 
countries joined the EU, including the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). The northern part of 
the island, however, was excluded from the aquis communautaire1 and is therefore not 
affected by the EU in the same way as the southern part. The north is viewed by many as 
a “quasi-state” since it has no recognition by any other states than Turkey. Either way, 
the two states are part of the same island; join much history and also a Constitution from 
1960. The way the EU could and can play a role in this conflict is therefore quite 
complex. How is the integrating force of the EU affecting this conflict? To help answer 
this question we have to look at various integration theories and their stance on 
enlargement, cooperation, conflict and security. European integration can be analyzed 
                                                 
1 Acquis communautaire is all the principles, laws, practices, duties and goals within the EU. These are 
formulated in all the previous treaties, which all applicant country has to accept and implement before 
accession to the EU.  
 23
through various perspectives, whereas some theories embrace and clarify certain 
elements, and thereby make it harder to spot others. The theories I have chosen to use 
here are neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism. The two 
first theories can be labeled as rationalism which also better can be compared to 
constructivism, which is a meta theory (Rieker 2004). The debate between these two 
approaches has been going on for many years, and has recently reached the study of 
integration. What they all share, however, is that they are not primarily concerned with 
the development of particular policies, but with the abstract reflection on European 
integration. 
 
Neo-functionalism 
Ernst Haas developed the theory of neo-functionalism in his book “The uniting of 
Europe”, and according to his definition, European integration is a… 
 
“… process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new 
centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing 
national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new 
political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.” (Haas 1958, 16) 
 
This implies that the ultimate goal for Haas is the supranational organization which 
becomes the new centre of political and economic activities. The integration towards this 
goal would happen almost automatically through a cumulative process. 
According to Haas the key to European integration is the “logic of sectoral 
integration”. This means that integration would spread from sector to sector, a so-called 
“spillover” effect. Technology and the expanding size of economic activity would lead to 
integration in one sector, which again would spill over into other sectors, like the political 
sector. Even though the focus of integration has been on “low politics” (economic 
politics), neo- functionalism presumes that the integration process will proceed from 
cooperation in “low” politics to “high” politics (foreign and defense policies), because 
“low” politics is less contentious than “high” politics (Eriksen and Fossum 1999). 
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Haas believed that the modern industrial technology would make even the largest 
European countries too small to produce effective enough. Larger units, across borders, 
would be more effective. The nation state was passé (Førland and Claes 1998). Political 
and economic cooperation could only happen if there was an overarching and 
supranational institution. The goal was therefore, to Haas and the neo-functionalists, to 
attain a federal union of states (Hatay 2001). The neo- functional theories is based on the 
elite level, because they saw political and economic interest groups as the driving forces 
of integration. Domestic politics and the national governments are not the central players 
in European integration. The main players are the private marked leaders and the 
employee of the Commission (Førland and Claes 1998). 
The neo-functional theories made huge predictions on the future of Europe. The 
only drawback was that many of these predictions did not happen. When the integration 
process nearly stopped during the 60s, the neo-functionalists got problems explaining 
what happened. Historians wrote essays about how it was actually the state leaders who 
had pushed the EEC onwards and not the enterprise leaders or the Eurocrats. Real life and 
the theories of neo-functionalism did not work well together, and theorists then 
developed more moderate neo-functional theories about integration. What make this 
theory worth noting today are, according Førland and Claes (1998), three things: The 
theory highlight that the production technology is the basis for the political institutions. 
When trade expands across borders, the pressure for supranational institutions grows. 
Secondly, the neo-functionalists urge us not only to narrow our analysis to the formal 
decision makers, because other players may also have much power, for instance interest 
groups and organizations. Third, no integration analysis should forget the driving force of 
the common institutions, because they are the ones who work all the time to strengthen 
the integration process and make the basis for the decision makers. 
The integration process in Europe has bound the member countries together in a 
security community. The use of violence between them is almost unthinkable today. 
However, this does not mean that the threat to security is extinct, especially concerning 
ethnic conflicts. The success of the neo- functional interdependence model of European 
integration process in ending the German French rivalry is often held up as a model to be 
followed (Jakobsson Hatay 2001). 
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 Neo-functionalism has problems with explaining enlargement. They regard 
expansion into additional functional tasks as a positive thing, but not extension into 
additional territorial units. If their predictions had proven right, Switzerland would long 
time ago been a member and Greece would not have. This is because Switzerland is more 
“European” than Greece. Enlargement is, according to this approach, delaying the 
spillover effect, unless the spill over is built into the access negotiations process as a 
means of compensating existing members or accommodating new ones. The neo-
functionalists will also pay much attention to whether the full aquis have been imposed 
upon new members and how enlargement treat the aquis (Schmitter 2004). 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism  
Liberal intergovernmentalism aims at explaining why interstate cooperation in general 
and European integration in particular occurs. The clearest protest to the neo-functional 
approach is liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), and the greatest contributor to this 
approach is Andrew Moravcsik. His theories are inspired of the neo- realist theories. 
Neo- realists suggest that it is not just uneven development or distribution of power 
among states that leads to conflicts. They believe that the struggle for power is the result 
of the structure of the international system at whole, rather than the nature of man. The 
main problem, according to the neo-realists, is the anarchic international system, which 
means that there is no world government that can provide law and order among the nation 
states. This lack of authority is the key to understand the international system and 
international relations theory. The self-help situation leads to a security dilemma, which 
leads to lack of trust among states living in the anarchic system. States arm themselves in 
order to pursue the rational goal of self- preservation (Genest 1996). 
Moravcsik wanted the EU to be considered just as an interstate organization, where 
the nation states played the key role. As in neo-realism, Moravcsik emphasized the states 
and the rational behavior of these. Cost and benefit of international interdependence is 
seen as determinants of national preferences. The point where Moravcsik parts from neo-
realism is that he emphasizes domestic politics more, and the power struggle between 
states less than neo-realists would (Førland and Claes 1998). Moravcsik himself stresses 
the distinctions between neo- functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism in his 
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article “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist approach”: 
 
“Where neo-functionalism emphasizes domestic technocratic consensus, liberal 
intergovernmentalism looks to domestic coalitional struggles. Where 
neo-functionalism emphasizes opportunities to upgrade the common interest, liberal 
intergovernmentalism stresses the role of relative power. Where neo-functionalism 
emphasizes the active role of supranational officials in shaping bargaining 
outcomes, liberal intergovernmentalism stresses instead passive institutions and the 
autonomy of national leaders. Ironically, the EC's 'democratic deficit' may be a 
fundamental source of its success”(Moravcsik 1993, 518). 
 
LI sees the domestic politics in the EU countries as important and is thus a first step in a 
LI- analysis of European integration. The domestic politics is dominated by a power 
struggle between various political parties and private corporates. They fight for 
government control and thereby the interests of the country. This is where the liberal 
element appears. This relationship between state and society makes the system dynamic, 
since domestic power shifts is a response to bottom-up pressure. Moravcsik seeks to 
refute the neo-functional notion that integration weakens the state through diffusion of 
power and argues that integration strengthens the state (Eriksen and Fossum 1999).  
The central claim in LI analysis is that integration after 1955 reflects three factors 
which made governments willing to delegate or pool their power: The first factor is the 
economic interest. Secondly, it is the interstate bargaining. The bargaining stage seeks to 
explain the efficiency and distributional outcomes. Here two possible explanations of 
agreements on substance are contrasted: asymmetrical interdependence or supranational 
entrepreneurship. Moravcsik arrives at the answer that asymmetrical interdependence has 
most explanatory power. Increased interdependence between the states in Western 
Europe can make states with competing trade areas liable to cooperate on economic 
fields, like the customs-union and the inner market (Førland and Claes 1998). States 
bargain through a “give and take” game where the result is a regime or a treaty. The EU 
has grown so complex because the premium of cooperating is so high that they could 
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agree on special treatment of the smaller countries. The third factor is the commitment of 
the states to transfer sovereignty (Rieker 2004). 
A central element in this analysis is enlargement. How does the LI explain EU 
enlargement? It is indeed a hard task to explain EU enlargement from a LI perspective. 
Demetriou (1998) argues that the last enlargement round should not even be on the 
agenda given that it implies a realignment of the structural funding regime in favor of the 
Eastern European States and against the so called cohesion states of the EU. A further 
problem lies at the concept of bargaining. The focus on the great “bargains” (the EU 
pacts and treaties) collides in the enlargement process, where much of the work is done 
bi-laterally, multilaterally and with a very active Commission. However, LI provides an 
explanation of the member states enlargement preferences. 
But what does LI theory say about security? As a contrast to neo-realisms desire 
for military power and military security, LI theories do not focus much on this. In fact 
they are not very concerned about security at all (Rieker 2004). Their main focus is on 
economic interests and not much on security concerns. However, this does not mean that 
LI theories ignore the security and peace aspect of the EU. The rationalist that belonged 
more to the liberal wing than the realist one broadened the security scope and included 
more to the concept than the traditional military security aspect. This included 
environmental and social threats. The rationalist perspective (especially neo- realists and 
LI) will argue that the EU does not have any security policy. The first argument to this is 
that it is the member states that govern the EU and that it has not enough autonomy. 
Single member states will block common plan when it is in their interest. States will 
much likely not pool sovereignty on issues like security, defense or foreign policy. Some 
LI will argue that this will not always happen, though. When the most powerful states 
cooperate on high politics issues which are in their own interests, this can happen. But in 
the moment these interests diverge, the cooperation will fail. Secondly, prior attempts on 
building military forces and tighten the security aspect has not been successful. Thirdly 
the rationalist highlight the point that a common EU security policy will not likely 
happen in the future unless the military power grows or the decision-making system 
develops further. 
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This theory captures many different aspects of integration, both on national and 
the international level, a quality that Førland and Claes (1998) emphasizes highly. The 
major drawback of this theory is its lack of prediction. 
 
Social Constructivism 
Social constructivism has reached the study of European integration recently, and was 
much an effect of a misgiving among scholars about the narrow focus of the debates 
between neo- functionalists and LI. However, there is quite a lot of confusion in the field 
of European studies on what constitutes social constructivism and what distinguishes it 
from other integration theory approaches (Risse 2004). 
Social constructivism saw strength in sociological theories and turned to them, but 
without rejecting all the neo-realist structures. Alexander Went, John Ruggie and 
Emanuel Adler are great contributors to this approach, and they all have a vision to 
bridge the theoretical gaps in IR theory. The two main assumptions in social 
constructivist theory are the reasons for its growing acknowledgement. Firstly, the 
structures for human interaction are based on a common understanding of reality where 
ideas play a more important role than material relations. Further, an actor’s identity and 
interests are constructed by these common ideas. 
The constructivist approach to European integration is quite different from the 
rationalist theories. It is not a single theory, but a meta- theory, containing many different 
theories which all have some common features. Whereas the rationalist theories try to 
explain features of the EU, the constructivists try to understand it. Constructivists reject 
the demarcation between the natural world and the human or social world. It also rejects 
the methodological individualism that is present in all the previous mentioned theories. 
This means that it rejects the idea that the elementary unit of social life is the individual 
human action. The constructivists on the other hand are methodological collectivists, and 
thus draw conclusions from the character of the social phenomenon to characters of the 
individuals and their actions. The line of explanation is the opposite (Gilje and Grimen 
1993).  
Social constructivism has an ontology that is open for both hard (material) and 
soft (social facts) evidence. Its epistemology does not reject the possibility of testing 
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theories against evidence, but also puts emphasis on the more qualitative and interpretive 
methods of inquiry. It pay less attention to causal explanations, and more attention in 
interpreting and examining how structures and agents interact and are mutually 
constitutive (Rieker 2004). Our social environment constitutes who we are and our 
identities as social beings. At the same time, human agency creates, reproduces and 
change culture through our daily practices (Risse 2004). 
 Considered EU integration and enlargement, especially the 2004 enlargement, 
constructivist theories are more able to explain elements than rationalist theories do. The 
rationalist theories can not explain anomalies that are unexpected given the general 
theory. Constructivist approaches emphasize norm guided behavior and the impacts of 
norms, ideas and identity, in contrast to the narrow material- based rationalism (Jileva 
2004). From a rationalist view the eastern and southern enlargement is a “puzzle”, 
because the cost of the new membership countries will exceed the benefits. Jileva (2004) 
highlights several elements which are of importance for constructivist theory concerning 
enlargement: peace, democracy, rule of law, liberty, respect for human rights, solidarity, 
anti- discrimination and respect for sustainable development. She further emphasize the 
role of solidarity:  “Solidarity as a variable in integration could be an important factor in 
relations between actors with clashing interests and crucial for bringing together actors 
with asymmetrical powers as is the case with this round of enlargement” (Jileva 2004, 2). 
Risse (2004) argues that the growing European identity is an explanation to European 
integration generally, and especially concerning the Eastern enlargement. The states 
chare a collective identity and adhere to its constitutive norms and values and therefore 
are entitled to join the community. The Western states had also committed themselves 
during the Cold War to welcome a free and democratic Eastern Europe into the Western 
Community. The enlargement rounds in both NATO and the EU shows how normative 
commitments acquire their own dynamics as social rather than material capabilities 
(Risse 2004). But do norms affect all human behavior? The constructivist puzzle tells us 
that it might not. It can explain the decision to start the enlargement round, but not the 
bickering of the member states during the negotiations.   
Constructivists also have a different view on multilateral cooperation and 
integration. They regard social interaction and collective identity formation as vital for 
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cooperation and not bargaining, like the LI. Constructivists share this fact with the neo- 
functionalist. As already mentioned, the neo- functionalists believe that international 
interaction and cooperation can trigger processes of spillover, which can promote further 
integration. They do not accept the idea that the interests of states are fixed and 
independent of social structures (Rieker 2004). 
Another contrast to the rationalist approach is on the security issue. 
Constructivists maintain a wider concept of security than for instance neo-realists or 
liberal intergovernmenentalists (Rieker 2004). One example of this way of thinking is the 
Copenhagen School (CS), which developed a new framework for security. They accept 
the realist argument that security is about survival, but disagree about the military use to 
handle the security problem. Threats are not fixed objectives, but results of social 
constructs (Buzanet al. 1998). This approach is more flexible and more able to capture 
changes in threat perception and security instruments (Rieker 2004). The Copenhagen 
School and their view on security is dealt with later on in this chapter. 
 
Europeanization theory 
All the mentioned integration theories have a bottom-up perspective, where the dynamics 
and outcome of the European institution building are the main dependent variable. 
However, in Europeanization theory the perspective is top-down, focusing more on the 
impact of the integration on the domestic level (Börzel and Risse 2000).  
The concept of Europeanization is a contested one and scholars have used it in 
two ways which have caused confusion (Börzel and Risse 2000).  The first way is by 
using Europeanization to describe  
 
“… the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem-
solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the 
creation of authoritative rules. “ (Börzel and Risse 2000, 3) 
 
Europeanization is according to this point of view the independent variable which 
impacts upon domestic processes, policies and institutions. On the other hand, 
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Europeanization describes “an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape 
of politics to the degree that EU political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy making.” (Börzel and Risse 2000, 3). 
This refers to the processes and mechanisms by which European institution building can 
cause change at the domestic level. 
 In this chapter I will use the first definition, since I want to explore both the 
processes by which European integration affects domestic change and the outcome of this 
change. The focus will be on Europeanization as a force in conflict settlement or conflict 
resolution in the context of secessionist crises. The next chapters will deal with the role 
the EU have in this process of change, whether it be as a framework or as an active 
player. This part will also put particular stress on Europeanization through conditionality 
and through social learning, but before that it is important to know the theoretical 
conceptualizations of Europeanization: rational-choice institutionalism and constructivist 
institutionalism.   
 
“New institutionalism”: Rational- choice institutionalism and constructivist 
institutionalism 
How do the EU rules, norms and policies affecting domestic politics and policy? To 
answer this, scholars of Europeanization have gone to the theories of “new 
institutionalism” (Börzel and Risse 2003). Institutions are classically understood as the 
formal rules, standard operating procedures and organizations of government. However, 
in the “new” understanding, an institution also encompasses informal norms, routines and 
conventions. The seemingly banal claim that institutions matter and influence relevant 
political behavior must be understood primarily as a reaction to post-war behavioralism 
and rational choice that approach politics from a rather atomized conception of the 
individual. Börzel and Risse (2003) refers to two types of institutionalism, namely 
rational choice institutionalism and sociological / constructivist institutionalism. Both 
theories agree that institutions matter, but they differ fundamentally in their arguments 
about how the institutions matter. Simplifying it slightly, the rationalists define 
institutions as rules of the game, both formal and informal, that provide incentives for 
rational actors to pursue their strategies. This contrasts the constructivist scholars who 
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believe that institutions include informal norms and intersubjective understandings as 
well as formal rules. 
The rational choice institutionalists see the misfit between European and domestic 
policies, processes and institutions as making opportunities and constraints to pursue their 
interests. If theses political opportunity structures are to be used, it requires actors who 
exploit these opportunities and avoid the constraints. This approach sees Europeanization 
as leading to domestic change through differential empowerment of actors resulting from 
a redistribution of resources at the domestic level. Rational institutionalism embodies a 
“logic of consequentialism” which treats actors as rational and goal oriented. The actors 
engage in the interaction, weighing the costs and benefits of different strategies.  
The liberal intergovernmentalists (LI) think that the European opportunities and 
constraints strengthen the action capacities of national executives and enhancing their 
autonomy vis a vis other domestic actors. Neo-functionalists think in a different way, and 
believe that Europeanization provides societal and sub-national actors with new resources 
since the EU enables them to bypass the national executives. 
On the other hand, the sociological / constructivist institutionalism define 
institutions as having a more important and fundamental role, since the institutions 
constitute and shape not only their incentives, but their preferences and identities as well 
(Pollack 2000). In their view, the rationalists can capture parts of the effects of 
institutions, but they lack the ability of grasping and theorizing about the more important 
effects of institutions. The sociologist / constructivists approach emphasize processes of 
persuasion. The advocates of this approach suggest that Europeanization leads to 
domestic change through socialization, which again result in norm internalization and the 
development of new identities. The approach draws on the “logic of appropriateness”, 
which means that the actions of the actors cannot simply be reduced to utility-
maximization and rational calculations, but are necessarily context-bound.  
But what degree of domestic change are we talking about? Three important 
changes can be mentioned here: Absorption, accommodation and transformation (Börzel 
and Risse 2000). Absorption is when member states are able to adjust the existing 
policies and incorporate the EU policies without having to change the essential features 
of the state. When member states accommodate EU policies the degree of domestic 
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change is higher than during absorption. The country adapts existing policies and 
institution without changing too much. Transformation is on the other hand known as a 
process with fundamental changes, where the member states replace their own policies 
and institutions with new ones.  
The EU as a framework and as a third party 
The EU can act in two ways, regarding conflict transformation and conflict resolution. It 
can provide a framework for resolving the Constitutional problems related to secessionist 
crisis or / and it can act directly as a mediator or indirectly by supporting mediation 
(Noutchevaet al. 2004). The EUs role as a mediator can be linked to the role it will have 
as a framework in a post-conflict situation. The EUs role as a mediator is intended to 
have a short term effect to the conflict, and the function of a framework has mainly long 
term effects. The role as a third party actor in conflicts is an important role of the EU, 
which can contribute much to conflict- solution or management.  
The “framework-function” adds new Constitutional and policy options to the 
solution of the conflict. In a conflict were the positions are very different concerning 
sovereignty and citizenship, the EUs multi-level framework for governance might be a 
good solution for both parties. The EU framework can also develop multiple identities, 
because EU membership offers an additional layer of identification, which can ease the 
tensions in ethnic conflicts. These two dimensions are not unrelated and must be seen in 
context with the conflict. 
Noutcheva et al. (2004) makes a distinction between the candidate states and the 
non-candidate or non-member states. The interaction between the EU and the candidate 
states are much more dynamic and two ways than the interaction between the EU and 
other peripheral states. Based on this, Noutcheva et al. (2004) makes a clearer definition 
of Europeanization and secessionist conflicts: 
 
“Europeanization in the field of secessionist conflict settlement and resolution 
should be understood as a process which is activated and encouraged by European 
institutions, primarily the EU, by linking the final outcome of the conflict to a certain 
degree of integration of the parties involved in it into European structures.” 
(Noutchevaet al. 2004, 7). 
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 The Europeanization of divided states is usually a highly asymmetrical process. There is 
asymmetry not only between the EU and individual states generally, but also in the 
interaction pattern between the EU and the two conflicting parties. One characteristic of 
the Europeanization of divided states is that there are no institutional channels for 
interaction between the EU and non-recognized authorities. EU integration and policies 
are often also perceived different by the different actors in the conflict. 
Europeanization here is then changes in external territorial boundaries. Politics, 
economy and life in general are very prone to changes in this area. Cyprus is a place in 
the middle. It is both inside the EU, but also outside. How does Europeanization alter the 
conflict? How does EU alter the conflict? Europeanization can be seen as working 
through three mechanisms which all interact with each other (Emerson and Noutcheva 
2004): Firstly; legal obligations in political and economic domains flowing from the 
requirements for accession to the EU, and / or from Council of Europe membership and 
accession to its “Convention on Human Rights and fundaments Freedom”. Secondly, 
objective changes in economic structures and the interest of individuals as a result of 
integration with Europe. Third and finally it is subjective changes in the beliefs, 
expectations and identity of the individual, feeding political will to adopt European 
norms of politics, civil society and business. 
These mechanisms can be seen as combining rational institutionalism through 
policies of conditionality and sociological institutionalism through norm diffusion and 
social learning (Emerson and Noutcheva 2004). 
 
Europeanization through conditionality 
To become an EU member, a state has to fulfill certain demands set by the EU. These 
demands are called the Copenhagen criteria, named after the Copenhagen summit in 2002 
where the accession criteria were agreed upon. The applicant state must have a stable 
democracy, a competitive marked economy, good record with minority treatment and a 
workable judicial system to start accession negotiation (Grabbe 2002). Previous studies 
of Europeanization have concentrated on the member states, but the EU exerts the same 
pressure on applicant states as well. The acquis communautaire has to be adopted by the 
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candidate states, and the negotiations are primarily concerned with determining how 
much of it that has to be implemented prior to accession (Grabbe 2003).  
The EU has much power in the area of conflict settlement. It can involve direct as a 
mediator or it can carry a policy of “carrots and sticks”, where the ultimate carrot for the 
actors involved in the conflict can be membership. Progressive inclusion in EU policies 
without formal membership can also act as a strong carrot. The EU can in return demand 
certain changes to the issues involved in the conflict. The most frequent disagreements on 
the conflict agenda concern specific issues as trade, monetary policy, taxation, refugee 
policy, citizenship and border issues. By attaching rewards to the solutions that the EU 
wants it can intervene in the conflict and help finding a compromise that satisfies both 
sides. However, it can also widen the gap between them by exacerbating their differences 
(Noutchevaet al. 2004).  
  The next question then is, how do these conditionality policies change domestic 
practices? The different theoretical approaches which are mentioned above have different 
answers to this question. Rational choice institutionalism argues that the actors are goal 
oriented and purposeful and will act with the cost benefit thought in mind. EU 
conditionality generates “simple learning”, which means that rationally calculating actors 
are met by Constitutional constraints and are then more prone to change their strategies 
and tactics but it still does not mean that their identities will change (Noutchevaet al. 
2004). The conditionality policies can have a direct effect by favoring one solution over 
another one, but it can also change the opportunity structures which are more an indirect 
effect. The latter is an important effect, since the EU cannot use its formal rules and laws 
outside the member area. Instead it can change the actor’s possibility for action, by 
favoring or legitimizing some and put constraints on others. The possibility for change is 
dependent of the compatibility between the EU conditions and demands and the domestic 
politics. The greater the incompatibility, the lesser chance for change through 
conditionality 
The changes made domestically can be merely superficial. Research indicates that 
conditionality often fails to promote compliance, especially in transition states were 
political or institutional changes are to be made. Dialogue and persuasion alone is often 
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not enough to produce compliance and that pressure and material incentives still are 
important elements (Checkel 2000). 
The most important factors to get positive results from conditionality use are the 
value that different domestic actors have concerning the EU benefits, but also how 
committed these actors are towards the EU project (Noutchevaet al. 2004). 
 
Europeanization through social learning 
Noutcheva et al. (2004) emphasizes that Europeanization through social learning has a 
more long term effect than Europeanization through conditionality. This is because 
through social learning the actors can change their strategies and also their actions. The 
constructivist approach argues that actors change their identities and thereby also their 
behavior and goals when interacting in a common institution. It is a process based on 
interaction, and Noutchevea, Tocci et al (2004) argue that the EU environment is a good 
arena for change because of its tight cooperation. The possibility for change through 
social learning is also possible for states or actors outside the EU, but it is then dependent 
on the relationship it has to the EU. As already mentioned above this approach draws on 
the “logic of appropriateness” which means that “actors are guided by collective shared 
understandings of what constitutes socially accepted behavior in a given rule structure” 
(Börzel and Risse 2000). 
The degree of success form this effect in a secessionist conflict is dependent on 
how the EU manages to mediate in the conflict situation and how the offered solution are 
compatible to, or fit the domestic political visions. This will again affect the opportunities 
and possibilities for dialogue with the conflicting parts. 
It is not the intention to give an impression that only one of these two processes is 
more important or that they don’t work together. There is a close link between them. 
However, the time aspect is an important one. The early changes in domestic policy and 
processes is perhaps better understood with a rational- choice approach were 
conditionality is important. But in the longer run it may be the internal forces which are 
the most important ones. The process of conditionality can be a hindrance to socialization 
and thus be a negative force, especially if some actors of the conflict regard the EU to 
support the other side of the conflict. 
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Börzel and Risse (2000) argue that there are two factors which can contribute to a 
transition of norms, values and identities. The first one is a so called “norm 
entrepreneur”, which mobilize domestically. The “norm entrepreneur” mobilizes policy 
makers to make policy changes by increasing the cost of certain strategies, but they also 
try to redefine the interests and identities of the involved actors. Secondly there can be 
consensus-oriented institutions that entail collective understandings of appropriate 
behavior. In that way they can influence domestic actors and the way they behave 
towards the EU.  
 
Security theory and the Copenhagen School 
The debate about security theory has developed quite different in Europe and in the US. 
While the debate in Europe is vibrant and dynamic with lots of new “schools” and 
thoughts, the American theoretical framework for security is based mainly on the 
traditional realist point of view. One of these new “schools” in Europe is the Copenhagen 
School (CS), which developed as a result of the debates about security during the 1970s 
and 1980s and as a critique to the narrow concept of security. The approach finds it 
important to discriminate and separate issues from non-security to be able to have a clear 
sense of what security really is. Identifying security issues is easy for traditionalists who 
equate security with military issues and the use of force (Buzanet al. 1998). However, it 
is more difficult when security is moved out of the military sector. This school argues for 
a constructivist approach that extends the analysis of international security to culture, 
economics and the environment, but at the same time incorporates the traditional realist 
position. They seek to find coherence by exploring the logic of security to find out what 
differentiates security and the process of securitization from the political process.  
 The CS is built around three main ideas: 1) securitization, 2) sectors and 3) 
regional security complexes, but in this chapter I will focus mainly on the securitization 
idea and on regional security complexes. The reason for this is that these two elements 
features this school the best, but they are also elements that can explain processes in the 
Cyprus conflict and the EU relationship. 
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Securitization and desecuritization 
According to (Buzanet al. 1998) security is the move that takes politics beyond the rules 
of the game and frames the issues as a special kind of politics or as above politics. 
Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization, which is dealt 
with differently by all actors. States can for instance politicize religion (Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Burma) while other will securitize culture (former USSR and Iran). This link 
between politicization and securitization does not imply that securitization always goes 
through the state. The securitization process is in opposition to the politicization process, 
because the former will try to make issues appear more open and as a matter of choice. 
The latter is about making an issue urgent and existential that only can be dealt with by 
top leaders.    
But what is security? The CS theory states that one has to capture the power and 
functionality in the word. To do this one then has to analyze the linguistic practices in the 
discourse. The process of securitization is a speech act, and it is the utterance itself that is 
the act. By labeling something a security issue, it will become one. The definition of 
securitization is thus the “inter-subjective establishment of an existential threat which 
will have substantial political effects”(Buzanet al. 1998). Securitization can be studies 
directly through discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this 
particular rhetoric structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate 
violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? A discourse that takes the 
form of presenting something as an existential threat is making a securitization move, but 
it is only securitized if and when the audience accepts it as such (Buzanet al. 1998). 
Securitization is fulfilled only in the cases when there is an existential threat that 
legitimizes the breaking of rules. Security is thus about survival. However, it is difficult 
to sort the degree of importance of the threat, but the definition also makes it possible and 
easier to address whether or not something has become a real security threat.  
As already mentioned, the securitization process can be studied through security 
discourse. In this analysis we can make a distinction among three types of units: referent 
objects, securitizing actors and functional actors (Buzanet al. 1998). The referent object is 
the object that is threatened and has a legitimate claim to survival. Often, this object has 
been the state or the nation. Size and scale are two important elements that determine 
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what constitute a successful referent object. Small groups of people or individuals can 
seldom make a large audience listen and thus establish security legitimacy. In the other 
end of the scale there are also problems with constructing a security object. There have 
been attempts to unite all mankind, as a security object for instance towards weapon of 
mass destruction or environmental threats, but the outcome has not been successful. 
However, the middle scale (states, nations and civilizations) has proven successful at this 
aim. The reason for this can be the states or nations quest for rivalries with other limited 
collectives and thereby strengthen the “we”-feeling.  
The securitizing actor is the one who performs the security speech act. It might be 
a person (political leaders) or a group (bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists or pressure 
groups). It is difficult to label something as “actor” since it is problematic to say who or 
what acts, and finding the actor is more difficult than finding the referent object. The 
challenge is to not disaggregate it down to individuals, because much of social life is 
understandable when collectivities are seen as more than the sum of their members 
(methodological collectivism) (Buzanet al. 1998).  
A functional actor is an actor who is affecting the dynamics of a sector. They have 
much influence and impact on decisions in the security agenda since they are neither the 
referent object nor the securitizing actor. Another important group in this matter is the 
audience, which have to be convinced in order for the securitizing move to be successful. 
This group is often the citizens but it can vary according to the political system and the 
issue itself.  
The main object is to desecuritize the securitized issues. It implies a search for an 
alternative way to order the political inside (Roe 2004). Security should be seen as 
something negative and as a failure to dealing with issues in the normal political way. In 
the traditional view of security, security and insecurity is seen as opposite poles. 
However, in the CS approach a triad replaces these two poles. The new element is a-
security, which is a situation that has been desecuritized or never securitized. Insecurity is 
on the other hand a situation with a threat and no security against it. In a conflict 
resolution view, desecuritizing is preferred instead of producing more security.  
 Wævers position outline three options on how to desecuritize a situation. The first 
option is to avoid talking about issues related to security in the first place and also 
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prevent issues from being framed in terms of security. If that is not possible, the second 
option is to keep the responses in forms that do not generate security dilemmas. The third 
and final option is to move security issues back into the sphere of normal politics. The 
first option is perhaps difficult to achieve, since desecuritization is about moving 
something from security in the first place. The issues, which are already securitized, can 
either be transformed or managed.  In the latter situation the issue will not be entirely 
normalized but it will be a better climate.  
 
Regional security complex theory 
Another important element in this approach is the regional security complex theories. The 
definition of a security complex is “a set of states whose major security perceptions and 
concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be 
analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzanet al. 1998). The theory assumes that 
the complexes are a result of the international anarchic structure. A complex is a mini 
anarchy in the world anarchy with structures their own structures.  
 International security has changed its pattern after the end of the Cold War.  From 
being dominated by two superpowers, it is now dominated by regionalism. This theory 
looks mainly at the states in this regional pattern, and at the military and political sectors. 
Political and military threats travel more easily over short distances, and insecurity is 
therefore often associated with proximity. Many states fear their neighbors more than 
they fear states far away. Security within such a complex is more common than security 
outside one.  
 A central element in this theory is the insulator position. An insulator is an actor 
which is located in the border zone between several security complexes and its main task 
is to separate the different complexes from each other. Kazan (2002) argues that Turkey 
occupies an insulator position between three regional security complexes: The post 
Soviet complex, the European complex and the Middle East complex. Being in such an 
insulator position is not easy because they have to absorb the different security dynamics 
that surrounds it. The insulator can risk a collapse which can mean an end of its political 
entity. This can again trigger an active policy to encounter security risks and avoid 
isolation.  
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The Turkish case shows us this difficulty. Turkey’s strategic position as an 
insulator can have several consequences. Either Turkey can isolate itself from the 
European cooperation, or it can leave its position as an insulator. This last option can 
cause danger because the border structure will change.  The more likely scenario is, 
however, neither of these, because of the present Turkish desire for EU membership and 
cooperation  (Kazan 2002)  
 
Summary 
To frame this thesis about the EU and the Cyprus conflict, I have chosen theories 
concerning integration, Europeanization and security. There are many sub-theories in all 
the theories, but it is important to choose the theories that can explain the process or case 
in the best way. Different approaches can explain different sides about integration; 
Europeanization or security and they are not supposed to explain all aspects. 
The integration theories I have chosen to use here are neo-functionalism, liberal 
intergovernmentalism and constructivism. The two first theories are under the theory 
umbrella of rationalism. This contrasts to the constructive approach. I find it important to 
examine several approaches here because all the theories and approaches are focusing on 
different sides and processes of the EU and its integration. By only using one theory, one 
will end up with a narrow frame that is not able to explain various sides and effects.  
Theories about integration is important because it helps us to explain processes 
and outcomes of integration, which again can lead to better understanding of the current 
set of institutions, but it can also help us understand what will happen in the future. It is 
also argued previously that “pure” empirical knowledge is of little use in social science. 
This is because all empirical representations are filled with particular feelings, qualities 
or ideas, and that this “facts” will only provide us with a superficial understanding of a 
phenomenon or a process.  
I also find it important to examine theories of Europeanization. Contrasting to the 
integration theories, these theories have a top-down view and looks at the effects of the 
integration. In my case, it will be useful to see how the EU has played a role in the 
conflict and what effect it might have had. In conflict zones, the EU can play a role both 
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through conditionality, but also through social learning. The EU can also play the role as 
a third party who mediates in a conflict. This last element will be important in the present 
analysis. 
 Security is a red line through this chapter, because security is a major issue in the 
Cyprus conflict. The traditional realist perspective of security is not enough to explain the 
case of Cyprus, which is the reason for focusing on the Copenhagen School and their 
mixture of realist and constructivist thoughts. Both securitization and regional security 
complexes are important elements to better understand the conflict itself, but also the 
Turkish position.   
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4. History and background 
 
Introduction 
The history of Cyprus is not easy to tell. Nevertheless, it is an exciting and engaging 
history. To understand the case as it rests today, it is important to know the history well, 
both that of Cyprus, but also that of Turkey and Greece. It is a history with many 
different voices and views, and one will get different stories if asking a Turkish Cypriot, 
a Greek Cypriot, a Greek or a Turkish person. However, this chapter will try to reveal the 
most important moments, events and processes so we can better understand the situation 
today. 
 This chapter will start with the Ottoman Empire era and end when the EU 
membership application was a fact in 1990. Chapter 5 will continue the history from 
1990 and onwards. 
 
From the Ottoman Empire to the Colony era 
Cyprus is located with an important geostrategic position in the Mediterranean Sea close 
to both the Middle East, Europe and Africa. Cyprus has in the past been part of both the 
Roman empire and the Bysants before it in 1573 became a part of the Ottoman Empire. 
This explains why Cyprus today consists of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. 
However, during history, the majority of the population on Cyprus was of Greek origin 
(Stivachtis 2000). In the eyes of Greecs and Greek Cypriots, Cyprus has been a Greek 
island from 1500 BC and has since then remained the centre of Greek culture, however 
with some special characteristics (Diez 2000). 
 The island came under British administration in 1878 as a strategic choice from 
The Ottoman Empire after its loss in the war against Russia in 1877-78. If Russia were to 
attack Europe through the Dardanells they would also attack directly on British interests. 
When World War One started, the Ottomans joined the Central powers and Britain 
annexed Cyprus, something which the Ottoman government did not recognize. Britain 
offered the island to Greece, but Greece had already then decided to be neutral in the war. 
Atatürk became the leader of the new Turkish republic after the war, and accepted the 
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annexation of Cyprus to Britain. The island became a British crown colony in 1925 
(Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994). 
The British rulers played a rather hard game of “split and rule”, and the 
opposition grew increasingly during the 1940s and the 1950s. In 1955 the Greek Cypriot 
Guerrilla started several attacks against the colonists, which marked the beginning of the 
end of the British rule. The guerrilla, named EOKA2, wanted independence from Britain, 
and union (enosis in Greek) with Greece  (Demetriou 2004a, Stivachtis 2000, Tocci and 
Kovziridze 2004).  The Turkish Cypriots also formed their own underground political 
organization, called Volkan, which cooperated with the Turkish Resistance Organization 
(Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994). This events made the hostility and mistrust between the 
two communities even bigger, and Britain did not succeed in keeping Cyprus under its 
soverignty.  
 
The Constitution, the Cold War context and difficult political 
environment 
The constant failures of all parties involved to end the conflict led to the Conferencens in 
London and Zurich were the Constitution agreement was signed. The Constitution made 
in 1959 and 1960 was a unique Constitution in the sense that it tried to make a balance 
between the Greek wish for enosis (union with Greece and Cyprus) and the Turkish wish 
for taksim (division of the island). To preserve the Constitution and prevent it from enosis 
and taksim, Britain, Greece and Turkey got garantour power, which made them able to 
intervene and they got”...the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the 
state of affaris established by the Treaty.” (article 4) (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004, 4) The 
Turkish Cypriot side got more power in the new state than the demographic proportion 
would say (30% instead of 18%). Neither of the two communities were allowed to make 
contact with their motherland which could lead to secession. The new government 
consisted of a Greek Cypriot president, but the vice president should always be a Turkish 
Cypriot, both with veto power. The two communities therefore always had to agree on 
any issue. The Parliament consisted of 50 seats, were Greek Cypriots had 35 and Turkish 
Cypriots had 15. This meant that the Turkish side needed 12 votes to veto even though 
                                                 
2 Ethniki Organosis Kyrion Agoniston: The national Organization of Cypriot Fighters  
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the remaining 42 votes were in majority.  Demetriou (2004a) argues that the Constitution 
made the ethnic identity as major determinants of civic and political practice, and that the 
conflicts to come was spin offs of this identity conflict. The new state was a compromise 
which resulted in a new terriorial state, but not a nation in the sense that one was still 
either a Greek or a Turk (Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994). It was a political compromise 
based on realpolitik or realist thinking. This resulted in a treaty which ratified the existing 
distribution of power rather than solutions that would change that distribution in the 
direction of greater justice. The treaty was, according to (Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994) not 
an idealist seeking to rectify injustices. 
  This close cooperation proved to be ha hard task, and the years from 1960 to 1963 
were years with conflict and mistrust, not only because of the internal politics, but also 
because of patronage from the motherlands. The Greek Cypriots were from the early start 
angry with the Turkish Cypriots for using the office power to pave way for more Turkish 
influence. However, the main issue was the power sharing. The Greek Cypriots wanted a 
strong sentral government, while the opposite side wanted more power to the local 
municipalities. This mistrust lead to a Constitutional crisis in 1963, when Archbishop 
Makarios decided to revise the Constitution by introducing Constitutional amendments. 
He justified his decition by the fact that it was impossible to run the country in the 
present situation, were both sides actively used their veto against the other (Stivachtis 
2000). Other factors wich also played a part were the lack of experience in self- 
government, conflicting ethnopolitical goals, mistrust and a shared sense of insecurity 
(Joseph 2001). There were several judicial problems with Makarios` action. This was a 
decition made by Makarios alone, without consulting the interesting parties or the 
Turkish Cypriot Vice President. Stivachtis (2000) argues that Makarios should have 
consulted the guarantor powers, at least then it would not have been a unilateral decition. 
However, it has been indications that Makarios wish was enosis. This can be explained 
with his words: “Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek from the dawn of history and will 
remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over. Greek and undivided we shall 
preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece” (Stivachtis 2000, 5).The 
Turkish Cypriot MPs found this unacceptable and redrew from their seats in Parliament. 
This further ignited the conflict, which became violent in December 1963 (Demetriou 
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2004a). The amendments of 1963 introduced a majority- minority divide between the 
Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. It is from this “new” Constitution, Greek 
Cypriots have tried to solve the Cyprus conflict.  
This period in history is dominated by Cold War politics and the power struggle 
between USA and the Soviet Union. The US and NATO were sceptic about Makarios 
tight relationship with the Soviet Union and Nassers Egypt which again was related it to 
Cuba.When violations and crisis escalated in 1963, USA therefore wanted NATO forces 
to intervene in Cyprus to defend the West against the Communist East. It was important 
for President Makarios to keep Cyprus outside this conflict and he refused to let NATO 
forces into the island.  
 
UN intervention 
The UN intervened in 1964 because of the violence, and this action marks an important 
point in the history of Cyprus (interview, Turkish Cypriot political researcher, 2004). At 
this point the government had collapsed and the Turkish Cypriots were already moving 
into enclaves for reason of self defence. The UN felt at that time that the Greek Cypriots 
were the remaining rulers of the government and therefore asked them for permission to 
send troops to the island, even though the government at that time was not the de jure 
government. This de facto acceptance of the purely Greek Cypriot government as the 
representative of the Cyprus government has carried on until today. This is also the point 
were troubles started seriously for the Turkish Cypriots (personal interview, november 
2004). The Greek Cypriots continued to run the Government as before without the 
Turkish Cypriots and the administration of Turkish Cypriots affaris were now dealt with 
by the representatives in the enclaves. The UN Security Council Resolution 186 povided 
for the stationing of a UN Peace keeping Force (UNFICYP) and UN lead mediation 
efforts (Zahedi 2001). However, this force was to small to make peace and order on the 
island. Greece also decided to send troops to the island, in fear of an Turkish invation. 
UNFICYP concisted of 7000 soldiers and policemen and the mandate was originally for 
three months. This mandate was exctended every sixth month and is still present on the 
island today. It remains the longest lasting peace keeping operation in the UN history. 
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Political situation in Greece 
The political situation prior to 1967 was unstable and there were many demonstrations, 
strikes and riots during those years. The civilian government seemed uncapable to control 
the situation, and the military made a coup on 21st of  April 1967. They were called the 
Colonels and they justified their coup with a growing fear of communist take-over. There 
was, however, no strong-hold in these claims, as the Colonels themselves admitted later. 
The real motive for the coup was the fear of a new “Centre Union”- government in the 
May election. If they were to win, many of the high ranking and right wing officers could 
expect retirement (Clogg 1979). The leader of the coup was a greek intelligence officer, 
named George Papadopoulos. The regime was a totalitarian regime, where Papadopoulos 
appointed himself as Prime Minister, removed the parliament and refused to have free 
elections. However, the regime met little opposition at the time of the coup, and most 
Greeks were not affected much negatively. The economy grew quickly and decitions 
were taken efficiently without a huge bureacracy and parliament.  
The ruling junta wanted to solve the Cyprus conflict by incorporate Cyprus into 
Greece, with assistance from the US. They were displeased with the way Makarios ruled 
the country and tried several times to remove him from his position. They infiltrated the 
national guard in Cyprus, and on the 15th of July in 1974 the Greek terrorist organization, 
EOKA-B, gave green light to revome Makarios through a coup. Makarios himself, 
condemned this action and stated that the Colonel regime was seeking to destroy the state 
of Cyprus. He escaped from the island, and a former EOKA gunman, Nikos Samson, was 
replaced as president (Clogg 1979).  
Greece was expelled from The Council of Europe and blocked from joining the 
EEC, therefore they had to rely on means and support from the US (Clogg 1979, 
Hitchens 2001). The Pentagon was anxious to maintain good relationship with Greece to 
maintain their strategic important bases, especially concerning the Arab- Israeli wars of 
1967 and 1973 and the increasing naval presence of Soviet in the Mediterranean (Clogg 
1979).  
The Colonel regime showed itself incapable to deal with the growing problems 
which confronted Greece. The oil crises which followed the Yom Kippur war in 1973 
was severely affecting Greece, since they had little indigenous sources of energy. The 
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inflation continued unchecked and they punished dissidents even harder than before 
(Clogg 1979). The lack of political  expertise and refusal to restore democracy lead to the 
Colonels downfall in 1974. Papadopoulos was replaced with the new Prime Minister, 
Konstantinos Karamanlis, who had been in French exile in eleven years (Clogg 1992). 
 
The Turkish invasion 
The Turkish military had much power in Turkey and also supporting gangster 
organization in Cyprus.  The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot Governments were frightened 
of what could happen if the Greek junta got too much power, and feared the same destiny 
as Crete some years earlyer (enosis with Greece). As gurantour power they had the right 
to intervene if they thought the Turkish Cypriot rights were, or were to become, violated. 
When the coup against Makarios occurred the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara feared for 
civilian lives and five days after the Greek coup they intervened in Cyprus. The Turkish 
army took control over a narrow, ten mile strip around the city of Kyrenia, but attacked a 
second time after failed negotiations. This time they took control over 37% of the island 
(Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). The line which separated the two communities has became 
known as the “green line”. According to Hitchens (1997) an important reason for Turkeys 
invation is the influence of the great powers and their interest in Cyprus. He especially 
highlight US Secretary of State Kissinger as having great influence by signaling to 
Ankara that he did not dissaprove of Turkeys actions.  
The north and south have quite different memories and thoughts about the 1974 
invasions, a fact that the official statements from the respective Foreign Affairs 
departments show us. The Turkish Cypriots asked all the guarantor powers for help, but 
Turkey was the only one who responded. Turkey sent troops in order to save the lives of 
the Turkish Cypriots and mention it as a peace operation3. They also view the failed 
negotiations in the time between the two interventions as a Greek Cypriot fault, and thus 
had to intervene the second time to end the sufferings of the Turkish Cypriot people. On 
the other hand, the Greek Cypriots viewed this invasion as a long time yearned action 
from Turkey. They had feared an invasion for over a decade and refused the legality in 
                                                 
3 Homepage of the TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
http://www.trncpio.org/ingilizce/DOSYALAR/HISTORICAL%20BACKGROUND.htm 
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the action from Turkey. They saw the invasion as a violation on all rules of international 
legality, including the UN charter4. 
Despite all the reasons for the attack, the Turkish side had de facto control over a 
huge area of the island. It comprised 75% of the coastline, 70% of the economic area with 
50% of its industrial enterprises, 60% of natural resources, 65% of the total cultivated 
land and 73% of the tourist infrastructure (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004).  As a natural 
concequence of this, many people of both origins were displaced. The figures are quite 
roughly, but are approxemately 140 -160 000 Greek Cypriots from the north and 60 000 
Turkish Cypriots from the south. Both areas were alsmost entirely ethnically cleansed 
(Tocci and Kovziridze 2004).  
Between the first and second Turkish attacks, the Greek Colonel- junta collapsed 
and the Greek Cypriot government was restored. Archbishop Makarios came back from 
exile and ruled the country until he died in 1977. From this point, both Greece and the 
Greek Cypriot side began to thrive economically. The success in the southern part of 
Cyprus was due to the international recognition of their state, Republic of Cyprus (RoC). 
The economy was based on trade and investments, especially light manufacturing goods, 
tourism and offshore financial services (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). On the other hand, 
the economy of the north was stagnating. All countries except Turkey condemned the 
invation and boycotted any form of trade or cooperation with the north. The result was a 
low economic development with mainly subsistence farming. The north did (and does) 
have a huge potential for tourism, but the lack of air links from other places than Turkey 
makes tourism difficult. 
It is important that one is careful with making general judgements in this case. It 
was not all Greek Cypriots who believed that the extermination of Turkish Cypriots and 
enosis with Greece was a good thing. Actually, quite few had such extreme thoughts 
(Stivachtis 2000). It is also important to bear in mind that the coup in 1974 did not aim 
only against the Turkish Cypriots, but also against the democratic republic of the south 
(RoC). One can also discuss whether the Turkish invasion was actually in accordance to 
the two Constitutional Treaties.  
                                                 
4 Homepage of the Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa.nsf/CQHistoricalReview?OpenForm 
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The political situation in Turkey 
To better understand the Turkish position in this event, it is  important to include some 
characteristics about the Turkish domestic and foreign politics during the 1970s and 
1980s. One reason for this is the tight relationship between north- Cyprus and Turkey, but 
also the resemblence between politics in northern Cyprus and Turkey. Two elements are 
important here: Kemalism and the power of the military. Kemalism is the key principle in 
Turkish as well as in north-Cyprus politics. It evolves around six principles made by 
Mustafa Kemal (later called Atatürk which means “the father of the Turks”) (Lange 
1998). He was the state leader of the new Turkish state after the Ottoman Empire fall 
after the first World War, to his death in 1938. The importance of the different  principles 
has changed over time, but they are all part of the Turkish Constitution. The first one (and 
perhaps the most significant today) is the principle of laiklik, which means separation of 
state and religion. The state is to be in control over the religion, in other words the 
superior part. The second principle is nationalism (milliyetcilik), which for the Turks 
means absolute soverignithy and independence. The third one is that of republicanism 
(cumhuriyetcilik). The state must always remain republican, and never again attend to 
monarchy. The forth principle is closely linked to republicanism, and is called populism 
(halkcilik). The revolution and the change towards the west could only be done by 
support of the great majority of the people. Inkilapcilik is the fifth principle and can best 
be translated with revolutionism, but not in the most known way. It means condionless 
faithfulness to Kemalism and the modernisation process. The last one, etatism (or 
devletcilik), describes the importance of state controlled economy, at least for the most 
important bricks in the economy (Lange 1998, Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994). Lange (1998) 
states that it might be added a seventh principle to this list, that is the one of the military 
and their power.  
The Turkish military sees itself as the preserver of the secular state and of 
Atatürks principles. Since the birth of the new state, the military has intervened into 
government policy and sucessfully organized coups three times, in 1960, 1971 and 1980. 
There has also been several other coup attempts and -plans. The national security council 
(Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) is dominated by generals, and the councils mandate is to 
decide national security politics and also to excecute them. Ironically, this instituion and 
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its lack of democracy undermine the democratisation and preservation of sivil rights that 
the military want to promote5. A reduction of the councils power would mean a 
fundamental breach with the Kemalist way of thinking. A description of the political 
situation in Turkey is made by the left wing politician Ali Bayramoglu: “ The military 
has the power to act, but no responsibility. The sivil government has no power, but has 
all responsibility” (Lange 1998, 25). The military has a belief that they have the right to 
act against the government to preserve the citizens rights and well being. They also in a 
great extent feel superior to the “ordinary dying people”, a thought which is difficult for 
outsiders to comprehend. Despith all this; the military is both popular and acsepted in 
Turkey. People trust the military more than they trust other political and judicial 
institutions (Lange 1998). 
 Another reason why the military is so popular is the situation of the political 
parties. As already mentioned the political parties have little trust amongs the majority of 
the people and much of the reason for this is the lack of results. Working with party 
politics in Turkey is quite another way of doing politics than in Western Europe. Lange 
(1998) see this lack of action as a result of two processes. The party leaders has two 
major challenges, whereas the first one is the expectation that the parties produce political 
programmes and planes that they can use both in position and opposition. Secondly, the 
parties and party leaders are met by a demand of clientilism which is in greater extent 
than in other European parties (Lange 1998). This results in a situation where people who 
support a person or a party want a “treat back” for their support (for instance a job). The 
politicians has to spend much time dealing with these “clients” and their expectations, 
which leads to lack of time for other actions. Many people feel that the parties are unable 
to solve the serious problems, which again leads to a lack of legimitation of the 
politicians. In addition, the parties themselves lack democracy. The people in Turkey are 
more prone to devote itself to a powerful leader than in western Europe (Lange 1998). 
Many of these elements can be transferred to northern Cyprus. Both Kemalism 
and the military are central elements in northern- Cyprus political life, even though 
Turkish influence and military power has been limited during the last years.  
                                                 
5 Europaprogramments homepage for ”Fokus Europa”. ”Tyrkia utenfor EU”. Nr 3 1998.  
http://www.europaprogrammet.no/index.php?struct=100&join=340 
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The Aegian conflict  
The relationship between Greece and Turkey has for many years been a tense 
relationship. The border between Greece and Turkey is a source for many conflicts since 
the conquest of the Ottoman Empire, but also after its fall. The old borders of the 
Ottoman empire were drastically changed after World War One, and Turkey has because 
of this a rather tense relationship 360 degree around its country. The Aegian conflicts 
have several elements6, where the first one is the Greek demand for the Aegian islands 
own territorial water, which will result in the whole area as domestic Greek water. 
Turkey has threatened Greece with war if they increase the territorial zone from six to 
twelve nautical miles. Greece also demands air- space of ten nautical miles above their 
islands. Turkey  does not accept this demand and has often sent air planes into the zones. 
There are also conflicting views about military posts on some islands in the east Agean 
sea, which the Turks see as a breach of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Greece wants to 
solve these problems through the international court of justice in Haag, but Turkey on the 
other hand wants to solve it bilaterally. In addition to these Aegian problems, there are 
issues dealing with Turkish minorities in West Trakia in Eastern Greece7. The deep 
rooted sceptical Greek approach towards Turkey is much due to the long Ottoman 
conquest of Greece which lasted for four hundred years. There are powerful forces in 
both Greece and Turkey who resist reconseliation and peace between the two countries. 
 
Cyprus- EEC/EC relations before 1990 
The relationship between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU dates back to the early 
1970s. The Association Agreement between Cyprus and the EEC from 1972 provided for 
the gradual elimination of trade obstacles for industrial and agricultural products between 
Cyprus and the EEC. The early signs of interest were a result of the British application 
for EEC membership. Cyprus was dependent on exports to Britain and the prospect of 
loosing the Commonwealth tariff rate made the RoC government to seek arrangements 
                                                 
6 Europaprogrammets hjemmeside for ”Fokus Europa”. ”Tilnærming mellom erkefiendene”. Nr 4 2000. 
http://www.europaprogrammet.no/index.php?struct=91&join=236 
7 Europaprogrammets hjemmeside for ”Fokus Europa”. ”Tilnærming mellom erkefiendene”. Nr 4 2000. 
http://www.europaprogrammet.no/index.php?struct=91&join=236 
 
 54
with the EEC. The agreement with EEC provided for the gradual removal of trade 
obstacles for industrial and agricultural products between Cyprus and EEC. The plan was 
to enter a customs union after going through two phases. The first phase would be 
completed in1977 and the second phase in 1982. Because of the Turkish invasion this 
plan was delayed and the second phase ended in 1987, with the plan for the establishment 
of the customs union by the year 2002 (Joseph 2003). Ever since this point, the EC/EU- 
Cyprus negotiations have been conducted by the Greek Cypriot Government as the sole 
actor. After the Turkish invasion in 1974, the EC played only a side-role in the Cyprus 
question. There were, however, three important developments in this time period: Greece 
entered the EC in 1981, Turkey applied for EC membership in 1987 and Northern Cyprus 
proclaimed its own state in 1983. 
The Turkish Cypriot unilateral proclamation of the “Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus” (TRNC) in 1983 marked a change in EC relations with the parties in the conflict. 
Prior to this point, the EC had stressed that the relationship with Cyprus was to benefit 
both communities. The EC accepted, for instance, exports of fruits and agricultural 
products from the north as long as they had been certificated by the Chamber of 
Commerce in the north. This was perhaps one of the reasons why neither Turkey nor 
Northern Cyprus criticised the tight RoC- EC relationship. Turkey had also signed an 
association agreement with the EC. The EC also established a policy that they were to 
avoid involvement in the political and Constitutional problems on the island. They 
wanted to isolate the integration process from the political development in relation to the 
Cyprus problem (Hatay 2001). However, after 1983 the EC joined in the international 
condemnation and boycott of TRNC. All goods which were to leave the island were now 
bound to go through the RoC for legal documentation and exported through legal ports in 
the south. As a result of the international condemnation, the EC-TRNC relationship 
became difficult and almost non-existing. Turkey was, and still is, the only country which 
legitimizes TRNC. This fact made TRNC heavily dependent on Turkey for export and 
import. The unilateral declaration of independence made also the relationship with UN 
difficult 
 55
Peace attemts after 1974 
Since the UN intervened in 1964, they have been the chief peace negotiator in Cyprus. It 
is a history of little success and many failures. In 1975, shortly after the invasion, the UN 
Security Council launched a plan for a solution based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal 
federation (resolution 367). This resolution was the basis for the 1977 and 1979 high 
level agreements between Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktash and Archbishop 
Makarios and the later Greek Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou. The first high level 
agreement of 1977 stated four main principles (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). First the 
federation would be independent and bi-communal, secondly the territorial readjustments 
would take into account the economic viability of the entities involved and communal 
land ownership. The third principle was that provisions on movement, settlement and 
property (the so called “ three freedoms”) were to be included in the agreement. At last, 
the federal government would ensure the unity of the country. The 1979 high level 
agreement included ten more points. The result of this compromise was not successful.  
UN has later tried to mediate and make a framework for new negotiations. The 
UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, formed the “Draft Framework Agreement” in 
1984. The framework adressed the most important issues, such as federalism, 
independence, bicomunality and bizonality which would both unite and separate the two 
communities with the right balance. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, accepted the 
framework, but the Greek Cypriot President, Kyprianou, did not. This was because he did 
not believe the document  adressed the “three freedoms” (movement, settlement and 
property) in the best way (Zahedi 2001). The refusal of the framework was followed by 
years of stagnation. 
The Ghali set of ideas was the next attemt to solve the conflit. It stated that the 
republic was to become bi-communal concerning the Constitutional aspects and bi-zonal 
regarding the territorial aspects (Brewin 2000). It was important that both communities 
contributed in all organs and decitions, and the two states would have equal power and 
functions. The Turkish side, however, was asked to reduce their territoriy to 26% of the 
island and giving the cities of Famagusta and Morphou to the greek side. The two leaders 
on the island had different view about the relationship with EEC. The Greek Cypriot 
President, Vassiliou, wanted to have separate elections about EEC membership but was 
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open to whether or not the elections was to be held paralell with the framework elections. 
President Denktash, on the other hand, was reluctant to join the EEC until Turkey was a 
member too. The chances to agree was even more limited with the presidential election in 
RoC in 1993. Mr Clerides won the election and stated that “The UN Set of Ideas would 
block Cyprus course towards Europe.” (Brewin 2000). The stagnation in the negotiations 
lasted until 1997 when UN secretary general Kofi Annan launched his “Annan Plan”. The 
recent UN led peace negotiations and the “Annan Plan” will be examined more in chapter 
5. 
Summary 
This chapter contains some snapshots from history. However, telling history also mean 
that important events or facts can be left out, something which is always the weakness of 
telling history. When looking at a conflict as it rests today, it is nevertheless important to 
look back at the reasons for these events. This chapter starts with the era long time ago 
when both Ottomans and Venetians ruled the island, which has resulted in the two 
communities today. The two communities were brought together after British rule in 
1960 and given a Constitution which soon proved worthless. They were again separated 
after failed cooperation efforts and the Greek Cypriots kept control of the de jure 
government. This government also allowed the UN to intervene in 1964. The coup in 
Greece in 1967 resulted in Turkish protection for the Turkish Cypriot minority, which 
again resulted in the 1974- invasion. The two communities have been separated by the 
Green Line since then and the Republic of Cyprus has all along been the sole legitimate 
government in the eyes of the whole world except Turkey. Several peace efforts, mainly 
driven by the UN, have not led to success and the northern side remains isolated and 
condemned by the international community for its unilateral declaration of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus.  
 These events are crucial to know and understand when reading the next chapter, 
which deals with continuity of many of the mentioned events and processes.   
 57
 58
5. EU influence on the Cyprus conflict 
 
Introduction 
The European Union has contributed much to the peaceful environment we find in 
Europe today. It has frequently used its capabilities as a framework and as a third party 
actor in conflicts both within, but also at the borders in Europe. There are, however, also 
examples were the EU has not been the active player many wanted it to be, were its use 
of conditionality not has been enough and conflicts has not been solved. Cyprus is such a 
case. In this chapter I will try to reveal how the EU has influenced different actors in the 
conflict and also find reasons and explanations for this influence. 
 The EU had little impact on the conflict before 1972, when RoC became an 
associate member. However, the promising positive catalytic effect was brought to the 
fore after the EU application in 1990. The EU framework was also actively used in the 
UN mediation efforts in the late 1990s, and I will later show how the UN used this 
framework in its search for peace on the island. The most important actors in this conflict 
are by no doubt the Cypriots themselves and further on the chapter will show the EU 
impact on these players as well as their homelands, Greece and Turkey. 
 
International context 
The UN perspective on the Cyprus conflict  
The Annan Plan 
Until the 1990s, the UN mediation efforts had led to failure and all the plans proposed in 
the previous years did not lead to success. It almost looked like the UN was “a part of the 
problem” instead of a problem-solver. However, with the new Secretary General, Kofi 
Annan (since 1997), hope was made for solution and peace. The Turkish Cypriot 
leadership rejected any direct negotiations until November 2002, when Mr. Annan 
proposed a new plan that the parties were to discuss upon, the so called “Annan Plan”. 
This new plan was inviting the whole island to join the EU, and the plan was to reach an 
agreement by or at the Copenhagen Council in December 2002 (Tocci 2003). 
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 The new plan was more adequate and complex than any other previous plan, and 
consisted of 10 000 pages. It was to fulfill the basic needs of both communities and the 
three guarantor powers. The plan thoroughly tackled difficult issues such as property, 
political- and economic harmonization, territory adjustments and power sharing of the 
new government (Alexiouet al. 2003). It proposed a comprehensive solution to the 
Cyprus conflict, based on a bizonal and a bicommunal federation. The new United 
Cyprus Republic would be an independent state with a federal government and two equal 
states with their own parliaments. It resembled both the Belgian and the Swiss federal 
state model (Tocci 2003). The federal level were to take care of foreign policy and the 
relationship with the EU, the central bank, fiscal policy, aviation, communication, 
citizenship and the natural resources like water. Moreover, tourism, environment policy, 
health policy, agriculture, fisheries and industry were among the tasks that the two states 
would take care of more separately. The two states should, however, consult each other 
on most matters. There would also be territorial adjustments, which would reduce the 
TRNC zone to 28.5 percent. About 90 000 Greek Cypriot refugees would return to their 
old properties, and the rest would be quota restricted (Tocci 2003). The Annan plan had a 
huge impact for property issues for the Turkish Cypriots. Some benefited on the plan and 
others would be in limbo and suffer both economically, psychologically and socially. 55 
percent of all refugees were going to come back to their property, and the others would 
get almost all their property back (interview, Turkish Cypriot researcher 2004). Further, 
the troops on both sides would be reduced to 6000 over a certain time period and reduced 
to zero after the Turkish accession to the EU (Alexiouet al. 2003). The plan includes 
mechanisms to prevent the Greek Cypriots from buying too much land in the north, but 
also preventing the Anatolian Turks from settling on the island as today, and thereby 
changing the demography.  
 The plan was perceived differently by different actors and the negative elements 
in the plan were voiced, especially by the Greek Cypriots toward the referendums. The 
reasons for this will be clarified later on in the chapter.  
EU framework within the Annan Plan 
The Annan Plan tried to make a settlement within the EU more appealing to the skeptical 
Turkish Cypriots by utilizing the so called Belgian model. The Belgian model is based on 
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the consensus principle were each entity can use its right to veto and thus block a 
coordination process (Tocci 2003). The plan states that  
 
 “Cyprus shall be represented in the EU by the common state government in 
its areas of competence or where a matter concerns an area of its 
competence. Where a matter falls predominantly or exclusively into an area 
of competence of the constituent states, Cyprus may be represented either by 
a common state or a constituent state representative, provided the latter is 
able to commit Cyprus”8.  
 
This added considerable substance to the definition of political equality, which has been 
the basic need for the Turkish Cypriots. It further promised that the implementation of the 
acquis would not be an obstacle to find a solution. There were, however, some 
exemptions in the plan to allay the Turkish Cypriots. The three freedoms (movement, 
settlement and property acquisition) were to be implemented, but there would be 
restrictions on the two latter ones during a certain time period. In addition to this the 
Turkish Cypriot state would adopt temporary economic “safeguard measures”, if the EU 
internal marked laws threatened the economic development there (Tocci 2003). 
 The EU played a rather passive role in the bi-communal negotiations. It had seen 
itself, during the whole period, as having neither the duty nor the personnel to impose a 
settlement. The EU regarded the conflict as a matter to be settled between the two parties 
with help from the UN (Brewin 2000). However, the EU contributed much to the plan by 
utilizing the EU framework as a win-win proposal. Within this framework, the Greek 
Cypriot security concern would also be addressed. 
 There has also been argued that the process of the EU and that of the UN were 
two processes which were going in different directions and also in contradiction to each 
other. “One was trying to put the problem right and the other was pretending there was 
no problem” (interview, Turkish Cypriot political researcher, 2004). After the Helsinki 
Summit in 1999, when Turkey was given candidate status, these two processes were 
finally converging, but “it did not work out because one side was already there without 
any preconditions” (Interview, Turkish Cypriot political researcher, 2004). Another 
criticism against the EU membership clause in the Annan Plan was linked to the Greek 
                                                 
8 The Annan plan, fifth version: http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org 
 61
Cypriot opinion. They were not opening their arms to the Annan plan, in fact, they were 
quite resistant to it, according to a 2002 poll where 64 percent were against the plan 
(Tocci 2004). The reasons for this skepticism which further led to the massive “no” vote 
in the 2004- referendums will be dealt with later on.  
 
Negotiations and referendums  
While the access negotiations between the EU and RoC went on with rapid progress, the 
conflict settlement efforts moved slowly. Because much of the substance in the Annan 
Plan was based on the accession of a united Cyprus into the EU, it was important that the 
settlement would be clear before the signing of the Accession Treaty. UN revised the 
plan several times and there were total 5 different versions of the plan. The latest one was 
finished in 2002 and also the one that the Cypriot on both sides voted on in the 
referendums in 2004.  
 Much of the reason for this slow progress was the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
rejection to join the negotiations from 1997 until 2002. The Turkish Cypriots protested to 
the EU decision to start access negotiations to only the southern part, and almost instantly 
made an agreement with Turkey about further integration. The UN hoped to restart 
negotiations in 1998, but was again stopped by the EU accession negotiation. TRNC with 
president Denktash wanted international recognition and insisted on bilateral talks with 
the UN and not talks based on intercommunality. TRNC president Denktash joined 
negotiations in 2002 together with RoC president Clerides, after pressure from Turkish 
Prime Minister Ecevit. The plan required referendums in April 2003, something which 
never happened. During The Hague meeting in March 2003, the Secretary General 
acknowledged that there was no successful negotiation and that the referendums had to 
be postponed.   
 The final version of the plan, the fifth version, was a result of negotiation in 
Burgenstock in Switzerland in March 2004 between the Cypriot President 
Papadoupoulos, TRNC Prime Minister Talat, the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and 
the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. The UN Secretary General, US Secretary of State, 
Powell, and Verheugen who was the enlargement Commissioner, all followed the 
negotiations closely. The Secretary General was to fill inn the gaps at the end if there 
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were points that the two sides could not agree upon. In his speech before the referendums 
he stated: “This plan is inevitably a compromise.  It does not satisfy everyone’s demands. 
 But I believe it meets the core interests, and addresses the key concerns, of people on 
both sides.”9 These negotiations did not become a complete failure as many previous 
attempts, but the attending parties were not absolutely satisfied with the result. The 
reactions of the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot delegation were quite positive and 
described it as a “victory”, while the Greek Cypriot side and especially Prime Minister 
Papadopoulos meant that the last plan was not a fair compromise. They would, with the 
plan, loose their exclusive rights over the Republic of Cyprus and not represent the island 
by themselves (Tsoundarou 2004).  
 The time frame was extremely short for the two sides to digest the plan. From 
Burgestock to the RoC accession date was only three weeks. The referendums were to be 
held on 24th of April 2004 on both sides, and both sides had to vote “yes” for the plan to 
become active before the EU accession. If both sides voted positively, there would be an 
accession of a united Cyprus into the EU. As we know today, the Turkish side voted 
“yes” (64%), while the Greek Cypriots voted “no” (76%). On the 1st of May 2004, only 
the Greek side joined the EU, while the north is still isolated. This rejection was an 
enormous defeat to the international community and their hope to finally remove this 
long-standing problem from the agenda. For the first time since the Turkish invasion in 
1974, the Turkish Cypriots were promised that the international isolation would end even 
though their state would still not be recognized.  
 
The EU perspective on Cyprus 
Early relations: settlement through conditionality 
As the previous chapter showed, EU-Cyprus relations go back to the early 1970s when 
the Customs Union was signed. The application for membership was, however, not a fact 
until 1990, when RoC applied on behalf of the whole island. The wish for applying for 
membership was voiced from RoC and Greece long before 1990. During the Greek 
presidency in EC in 1988, Prime Minister Papandreou found it hard to get support for the 
                                                 
9 UN homepage: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9239.doc.htm 
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Greek anti-Turkish policies in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council, 
and he became thus a strong supporter of Greek Cypriot EU membership application. The 
political environment in the south was, however, not supporting such a move. The 
government, with Prime Minister Vassiliou, was dependent on support from the 
communist AKEL party, which was anti-European. They wanted the government to act 
within the UN framework and secure inter-communal agreements (Brewin 2000). This 
caused the two year delay until Mr. Vassiliou sent the application on 4th of July 1990. 
The Commission used three years to make an opinion on the matter, which in this respect 
is a long time. During the same years, the Commission made their opinion on 
respectively Sweden, Finland, Austria and Norway. There can be various reasons for this. 
First of all the member states were reluctant about interfering in the tense relationship 
between Greece and Turkey, and also with domestic issues in Cyprus. Secondly, many 
member states felt that the integration of a partly Muslim country would lead to a “clash 
of civilizations” (Brewin 2000). The member states also had to decide whether or not to 
accept the unilateral application on behalf of the whole island. However, the opinion of 
the Commission was positive to the geographic, cultural, economic and political situation 
in Cyprus, but negative to racial factors. They viewed that a political settlement would 
only strengthen the vocation that Cyprus belonged to the Community. A settlement 
would also open the way to restoration of human rights and pluralist democracy. The 
Opinion stated also that the result of accession to the Community would be “…increased 
security and prosperity and that it would help bring the two communities on the island 
closer together.” (Commission Opinion on the application by the Republic of Cyprus for 
membership 1993, 2). The Opinion concluded also that the application was on behalf of 
the whole island.  
 During these years, the EU took a rather neutral third party position. It actively 
supported UN sponsored help for settlement, but were distancing itself from settlement 
efforts. It saw the possible settlement of the conflict as having positive effects for the 
enlargement process of the EU.  
 Two years later, in March 1995, the General Affairs Council concluded that 
Cyprus was suitable for membership and that access negotiations would start six months 
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after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference in Amsterdam in October 1997 
(Brewin 2000). This event has later been called the “1995 compromise”.  
 
“1995 compromise” 
The compromise agreed upon during the French presidency in 1995 consisted of two 
elements. The first one was related to the Greek veto of the Turkish finalization of the 
Customs Union in 1994. The Union wanted Greece to lift this veto, but was then forced 
by Greece to set a starting date for accession of RoC without a prior settlement (Brewin 
2000). This meant that the conditionality on Cyprus was removed. Secondly, Greece also 
threatened to veto the whole 2004 enlargement, unless Cyprus was part of it. Greece 
stated that waiting for a settlement would mean a veto right for TRNC leader Rauf 
Denktash, and the relationship between Turkey and Greece did not get any better because 
of this compromise. Turkey was still convinced that RoC had no right to negotiate 
membership accession on behalf of the whole island, while Greece viewed Turkey with 
suspicion since it had occupied Greek land and did not want to improve the relationship. 
The French presidency and many other EU states saw the importance of having a good 
and stable relationship with Turkey, however not as a member in the club. It was 
important for them that Greece was on their side in achieving this goal, and they also 
believed that reconciling with Turkey would mean that Turkey could use pressure upon 
the TRNC leadership and thereby paving the way for settlement (Brewin 2000). 
However, this hope for reconciliation between the archenemies proved wrong. It was just 
a compromise were Turkey got the Customs Union and Greece got green light for 
enlargement for Cyprus. That was all. (Brewin 2000) The General Affairs Council met in 
February 1995 and discussed the compromise and eventually agreed upon the Greek 
demand.  
 After this, the stance of the EU became clearer. At the same time as the EU 
wanted to keep a safe distance to the conflict itself, it chose to have a close relationship 
with the RoC. This also meant that the neutral third party position was left for a more 
active and interested second party position behind the Greek Cypriot administration. 
 The integration of Cyprus into the EU shows that rational integration theories can 
be suitable as an explanatory vehicle. Liberal intergovernmentalism theory argue that 
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states and state leaders are important elements in enlargement and integration and that 
rational choices made by state leaders push integration forward. Greece took their 
rational choice (in threatening to veto the enlargement) because they saw it as necessary 
for their individual national interest and domestic pressure. However, the theory states 
that this is the main driving force and by saying this marginalizes the integrating power 
of the Commission, something which is not entirely applicable in this case. The neo-
functionalist integration theory suggests that economy is the driving force of economic 
and cooperation, and thus perhaps making this theory less applicable in this case. Ethnic 
conflicts are rather resistant to economic incentives for conflict resolution. “Low politics”  
like economic politics loses its meaning and the onset of an integration process can be 
prevented.  
The Luxembourg Summit and start of access negotiations 
During the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, the Council made two decisions. 
Firstly, they decided to start the access negotiations with RoC, and secondly they decided 
to stop the Turkish EU membership process. 
 The access negotiations started on 30th of March 1998, the same day as Cyprus 
joined its first meeting in Brussels. During access negotiations there are two main actors 
involved. On the one hand there is the Presidency of the Councils of Ministers, which 
rotates among the member states every six months. They present the negotiating positions 
which are agreed by the Council and also chair negotiating sessions at the level of 
ministers of their deputies10. The EU acquis consist of 31 chapters and each applicant 
country makes a position on each of the chapters. The applicant state appoints a chief 
negotiator with a supporting expert team. It is the Commission, or the Directorate 
General for Enlargement, who proposes the draft negotiating positions. The Parliament is 
informed all the way about the negotiations and gives its approval to the resulting 
accession treaties. All member states must ratify the treaties of accession in their own 
Parliaments or through referendums. The two parties then negotiate about the conditions 
under which each applicant country will join the EU. The rules and laws of the EU, the 
acquis, which originate from the major treaties (mainly from Rome, Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and Nice), must be accepted by the applicant state. The negotiations are 
                                                 
10 European Union homepage: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/index.htm 
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mainly about how these rules are adopted and the possible transitional arrangements. The 
final positions are approved unanimously by the Council and the results are integrated in 
an accession treaty which again is to be approved by the EP11.  
 The preparations for negotiations were successful and Cyprus was, according to 
the Commission, the country which posed fewest legal and economic problems to the EU 
of all the candidate countries. The fact that it was a small and prosperous island actually 
gave them an advantage. Negotiations focused on the thirty chapters of the acquis, and 
the Commission spent one day on each chapter with each applicant. The area which 
caused most problems were the issues of institutions, telecommunications and free 
movement of persons (Brewin 2000).  Even though the technical negotiation went well, 
there was still uncertainty about the whole enlargement process and the Cyprus issue in 
particular. The member countries argued about whether or not it was lawful and right to 
exclude the Turkish Cypriots from the negotiation. The absence of the Turkish Cypriots 
made the whole accession process easier and quicker, and they did not have to consider 
the ability of the Turkish Cypriots in implementing the acquis. Fractions in the Union, 
mainly driven by France and Germany, wanted to include the Turkish Cypriots to the 
negotiations. Greece, on the other hand, supported RoC in their wish to exclude TRNC 
until after the accession had been completed. However, the TRNC did not want to join 
the access negotiations with the EU because the negotiation team was formed by the 
RoC.  
 After the Luxembourg Summit in 1997, the EU appeared more conscious towards 
the Cyprus conflict. It had prior to this acted on behalf of the enlargement project with 
little understanding of the effects of their policies. It was not until after this that the EU 
understood that it could have a major leverage through the catalytic effect on the parties 
involved in the conflict. However, the EU has refrained to take any direct action in the 
conflict and rather supported the UN talks. 
 
                                                 
11 European Union homepage: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/index.htm 
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Helsinki Summit and green light for Turkey  
The Cyprus accession was emerging as a serious headache for the EU, but at the Helsinki 
Summit in December 1999, a glimmer of hope emerged. The EU removed conflict 
settlement as a condition for the RoC’s EU membership, although such a solution prior to 
accession was highly desirable. This was meant to serve several purposes, but mainly to 
ensure that the whole enlargement round would happen. With the removal of this clause, 
it became clear that the EU had no intentions of being a conflict solver in the Cyprus 
conflict.  It has been debated whether this was a mistake or not, but it is sure that the EU 
could not use strict conditionality on the RoC. During this Summit, Turkey was also 
recognized as a candidate for membership, with Greece’s blessing. This was to ensure the 
Western orientation, and to improve the reforms in Turkey. Making Turkey less skeptic 
about Europe would maybe soften its tone over the Cyprus issue. It was also important to 
eliminate much of the negative thoughts that had spread in Turkey about Europe after the 
Luxembourg Summit in 1997. 
  It is difficult to only use rationalist integration theories when explaining why the 
EU decided to offer full membership to Turkey, because the costs of such a membership 
would, at least in the short run, exceed the benefits. Neo-functionalism for instance 
proposes almost the opposite of what has been reality of the integration of Turkey. Neo-
functionalism argues that the development of a political community or of political 
integration between states is a result of economic integration. Economic integration 
becomes more profound and political spillover occurs almost automatically. However, 
the relationship with Turkey and the EU did not work this way. From the 1950s to 1989, 
Europe lived under the threat of communism and Turkey’s relationship to Europe became 
closer in spite of its economic backwardness. Turkey’s economic situation improved 
during the 1980s, but the threat from east disappeared almost at the same time and as a 
result, Turkey was pushed further into the periphery. As the threat from east disappeared 
Europe had no longer use of Turkey, and as a result the economic integration became 
stronger but the political integration became weaker.  The social constructivist approach 
can better explain this enlargement as it did with the Eastern European enlargement in 
April 2004. Cultural and environmental factors, identity and solidarity are among 
important issues in a constructivist approach as well as the methodological collectivist 
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way of thinking. Taking into account the Kemalist “Western” state ideology of Turkey as 
well as the growing notion of a European identity it would be natural from this point of 
view to integrate Turkey into the Union.  
 The negotiations with Cyprus closed successfully in 2002 and at the Copenhagen 
summit they were promised membership in May 2004, after ratification of the accession 
treaties in all member countries and in the European Parliament (Zervaktis 2004). 
   
The EU as a catalyst for peace 
When the application from RoC was accepted in 1993, many actors within politics and 
academia thought that the EU would play the role as a positive catalyst for peace and 
settlement (Diez 2000, Nugent 2003). The Commission report from 2002 stated that “It is 
the preference of the European Union that a settlement under UN auspices be reached 
before Cyprus’s accession, although, in line with the Helsinki European Council 
conclusions, this is not a pre-condition for Cyprus’s accession” (Commission 2002, 3). 
 Diez (2000) argues that there are three different types of catalytic effects which 
are not mutually exclusive. The first one can be called carrot catalyst, and was mostly 
articulated by the Greeks, the RoC government and EU officials. Here, the Turkish 
Cypriots would join the EU membership negotiations because they should see the huge 
benefits, which were mostly economic, that the EU membership would give them. They 
would benefit from the EUs structural development programs, the social cohesion funds 
and the extensive regional assistance network already in place (Antoniou 1999). If TRNC 
would join the EU together with RoC, they would be able to export their goods to the 
union without high taxes and also open up a potentially huge tourism industry.  
 
 “EU membership, in the framework of a settlement, will provide the most 
effective means for the northern part of the island to catch up in terms of 
economic modernization, growth and development. The economic 
reforms associated with EU accession will reduce disparities in incomes 
and in living standards on the island” (Commission 2002, 4). 
 
There is also a second type of catalyst, called the stick catalyst which was mainly used by 
Greek Cypriots towards Turkey, but also by the EU. They would try to get Turkey work 
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for a solution on the island and further democratization. If they failed at this task, their 
wish to integrate with Europe would prove difficult.  
 
“The Commission recalls that efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem form 
part of the enhanced political dialogue between the European Union and 
Turkey. As repeatedly stressed by the European Council, Turkey, 
together with all parties concerned, has a decisive interest in providing 
determined support for efforts towards a comprehensive settlement of the 
Cyprus problem. The Commission considers that there are favorable 
conditions for the two communities to reach a comprehensive settlement 
of the Cyprus problem before Cyprus’ accession to the EU on 1 May 
2004. The absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to 
Turkey’s EU aspirations.” (Commission 2003, 7). 
 
A third type of catalyst is the subversion catalyst. This idea of catalyst is different from 
the others, because the pressure here was to be put on the Greek Cypriot government. 
This was to be done by using technical issues of membership negotiations about the 
implementation of the acquis to soften the government vis a vis Turkey and TRNC. 
These ideas could not be presented as giving in to the TRNCs position. Seeing this from a 
neo-functionalist perspective, the technical issues such as the four freedoms (movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital) could be used to demand changes which would 
make settlement easier. It could encourage the RoC government to move closer to the 
TRNC government, either to cooperate more or to force TRNC to respond in some ways. 
It is called subversive, because it is supposed to have more a subversive character than 
aiming at open pressure (Diez 2002). 
  
The failure of the EU catalyst 
Even though we can say today that the EU failed to use its catalytic effect to make a 
settlement, it is important to note that the EU-process has brought with it positive effects 
as well. The Turkish Cypriots has, even thought is did not participate in the negotiations, 
debated the issue in the civil society. After many years of deadlock, the issue of moving 
closer to the south again was raised.  However, to blame the present situation entirely on 
the Turkish side or the Turkish Cypriot side is a wrong assumption. We also have to look 
at the catalyst itself, and see if the catalyst rest on wrong assumptions.  Diez (2000, Diez 
2002) argues that the EU as a catalyst failed due to several reasons. I will mention three 
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of them here. The first one has to do with the first type of catalyst mentioned here, the 
carrot catalyst. That view was that the economic security would outweigh the societal 
security, a fact that has proven wrong. This conflict is a conflict were identity matters 
much and where economic rationality does not have detrimental impact. The Turkish 
Cypriots view themselves poor, but not even close to other countries in the Middle East 
which, in their eyes, are poorer. The life is hard, but acceptable thanks to help form 
Turkey. The Turkish Cypriots feels that the economic security in the EU (though regional 
and structural funds) is not enough to guarantee the future. EU promised the Turkish 
Cypriots 260 millions Euro over a three-year period. However, the Turkish government 
transfers 260 millions to TRNC every year (interview, Turkish Cypriot political adviser). 
They are afraid of the Greek Cypriots and that they would be the one who benefits from 
an open north. Because of the trade embargo, the Turkish Cypriots would be unable to 
compete with their rich neighbors. They are afraid that economic wealth is going to fuel 
the conflict rather than repair it, since the starting point is unequal.  Both the carrot 
catalyst and the subversion catalyst are based on a universal economic rationality of the 
individual, while the dominant feature of the TRNC community is that economic security 
does not dominate societal or political security. This mismatch makes desecuritization 
unlikely (Diez 2000). The use of conditionality and the economic carrot can be explained 
with the rational choice institutionalism theory. The actors will, according to this theory, 
act rationally and goal oriented and weighing costs and benefits. However, this action did 
not work in this case, and it would therefore be appropriate to also make use of the 
constructivist institutionalist approach which focuses more on the role of identity when 
explaining state actions.  
 The second problematic assumption with the catalyst is that of fixed identities. All 
these three catalysts treat the actors involved as given since policy making processes 
require clearly identifiable actors. This can be problematic especially when the 
democratic legitimacy is in question (such as most liberation movements). “Who is 
representing who” can be asked about TRNC during the rule of Denktash. One can ask 
about the legitimacy of the representatives when the political system has for such a long 
time been dominated by one person. Was Denktash speaking for the Turkish Cypriots, 
Turkish settlers or Turks? While representing certain identities, one will marginalize or 
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exclude others. The border between the identities is contested in the same way as the 
identity itself, and they are constructed continually. It is through securitization that there 
borders are manifesting. It is by presenting a group as threatened that the identity of the 
group is created. The border between the identities will maintain as long as one continue 
to securitize it.  
 The third problem with the catalyst approach is its inadequate integration of the 
international context. The carrot- and subversion catalyst ignore the connection of the 
Cyprus conflict with the security framework of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Greek- 
Turkish conflict in special. The island of Cyprus is of core interest of Turkey because of 
its geographic location, and those favoring the carrot- and subversion catalyst are 
ignoring this fact, while the ones supporting the stick catalyst are making a too simple 
picture of the one sided Turkish influence. For those arguing of the stick catalyst, TRNC 
is a puppet state under Turkey and thus the conflict will only be solved through Turkey. It 
is also important to bear in mind the relationship between Greece and the Greek Cypriots 
and also the Greek-Turkish relationship. The securitization on the island is heavily 
interlinked with the securitization in the wider Mediterranean area, which again of course 
will only make the desecuritization even harder.   
 
The national context 
EU influence on the Greek Cypriot and Greek position  
The relationship between the Greek Cypriots and the Greeks has always been close. It has 
ranged from total dependence and attempted union (enosis) to the present close 
relationship with the EU as a bridge. There is, however, not unity in these close ties with 
motherland Greece in RoC.  The right wing parties, which have been in position almost 
always since 1960, celebrate the national holidays of Greece. The left wing in RoC, is on 
the other hand not so in favor of this close relationship with Greece. They identify more 
with Pan-Cypriotism and celebrate the October Revolution and 1st of May together with 
their compatriots in the north (Brewin 2000). 
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EU influencet on the Greek Cypriot position  
Most Greek Cypriots aim for a settlement in the conflict, but there are great differences in 
the perception of how this settlement is supposed to be. The Greek Cypriots are in 
majority on the island, and have therefore considered the Turkish Cypriots as minority 
and not equal partners to share the power with. They feel that the 1960 Constitution gave 
the Turkish Cypriots far more power than they were entitled to have. The desire for 
enosis, however, has diminished trough the years. Even though there still are some 
advocates of enosis left on the island, the official line in recent years has been legitimacy 
for the sovereign RoC. They nevertheless stress Hellenic culture and history. It is not the 
Turkish Cypriots who are the great enemy for the Greek Cypriot, but Turkey. There are 
as already mentioned a great number of Turkish settlers in the north, and they represent 
fear for the Greek Cypriots (Zahedi 2001). The main incentive for joining the EU was 
therefore political. Their membership has increased their bargaining position towards 
TRNC and Turkey and further legitimized their own state and sovereignty. 
 The governments from 1990 to 2003 have all been positive to the UN mediation 
efforts, with the Clerides government as perhaps one of the greatest supporters of the 
Annan Plan. The road towards EU membership has been supported by a wide spectrum 
of the Greek Cypriots. President Clerides, who represented the “Democratic Rally Party, 
DESY, got support from both the centre parties as well as the left wing AKEL. However, 
AKEL and the unions were in the beginning of the 1990s not in favor of the European 
orientation. They feared the disappearance of their own industries and also remembered 
the reluctant EU action during the crisis in 1974 (Zervaktis 2004). All the governments 
from 1990 were in great favor of the European direction. This has mainly been a tool for 
the Greek Cypriot to strengthen their bargaining position. With an EU membership they 
would strengthen their position as the only legitimate government on the island and thus 
further discredit the TRNC (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). An EU membership could also 
increase their leverage towards Turkey, which has throughout history been perceived as 
the greatest enemy. As we see the major incentive for the Greek Cypriot EU application 
was not economical but rather political. Likewise, the major impact of the EU has also 
been political. Within the Union, the Greek Cypriots feel secure, both from TRNC and 
Turkey. This stress on security (regarding both Greek- and Turkish Cypriots) favors the 
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use of a constructivist institutionalist theory and the constructivist integration theories. 
The constructivist approach uses a wider concept of security, where the threats that both 
sides feel are not fixed objectives, but results of social constructs, formed after decades of 
isolation. The security issues are constantly voiced and the words themselves become a 
part of the conflict as securitized elements. The rationalist theories and especially the 
liberal intergovernmentalist theory are not useful in the same way when studying security 
issues. Liberal intergovernmentalism theory is not concerned with security but focuses 
more on economic interests.  
 The political situation changed with the presidential election in February 2003. 
President Clerides, who was then 83 years old, chose to run for presidency only weeks 
before the election. He wanted to finish the Annan Plan and make sure that the settlement 
plans were put to life. The man who won the election was Tassos Papadopoulos, a well 
known nationalist and hard rival for the Greek Cypriot state  (Barkey 2003, Tocci 2003). 
He accepted, though unwillingly, the Annan Plan in March 2003, but was the driving 
force of the “no”-campaign during 2004. The EU membership was then secure, and he 
believed that he could use his membership to make an even better agreement. He 
believed that the plan was not a fair compromise, that it even encouraged partition and 
did nothing to promote unity (Tsoundarou 2004). As mentioned earlier, the Greek 
Cypriots would gain much from a settlement; however, these gains would not be of 
economic character. Any agreement would mean power-sharing, were the Turkish 
Cypriots would be a part of the de jure and the de facto Cypriot government. The most 
obvious gain would be in terms of territory, since the Annan Plan stated that the southern 
territory would increase and that many refugees were to return to their old properties. The 
Greek Cypriots were already skeptical about the settlement plan and could now legitimize 
their “no” even more because of the President point of view. One can label the President 
(and his collaborators) as a securitizing actor, because of his constant utterance and 
search for security.  
 The EU accession process has also helped to improve democracy in the RoC. It 
has contributed with a framework were both the use of conditionality and social learning 
has been and still is important. However, there are critical voices in RoC that claims that 
their country still is not deeply democratized yet. “Ethnic conflicts prevent societies from 
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actually becoming fully democratized.” (Interview from seminar with a Greek Cypriot 
political research organization, 2004). The media is, for instance, not accommodating real 
discussions about the conflict, and the children is indoctrinated with nationalistic 
literature in the education system. The long term effect of Europeanization through social 
learning can have a positive effect on the democracy in RoC, and promoting greater 
transparency and openness. It can be criticized that the EU perhaps did not spend enough 
time and resources on informing and transforming the Greek Cypriot opinion and 
government. For a long time the EU officials believed that they had to mainly influence 
and inform the northern side, because of the past, but realized too late the intransigence 
of the RoC government (Interview, Turkish Cypriot politician, 2004). 
 As will be shown later, the new rapprochement between Greece and Turkey after 
1999, contributed also to a new path for the political elite in RoC. The security threat 
from east was no longer strong, and the politicians could focus on the other elements 
concerning the settlement. This security gain is another clear direct impact of their EU 
membership. It would be small chances of being attacked by Turkey, whom themselves 
wanted membership.  
 Since RoC has been the only legitimate actor throughout the EU process, it is 
evident that the EU has had much more direct impact on the Greek Cypriot side than the 
Turkish Cypriot side, especially concerning policy and institutional issues. The RoC 
government has been able to participate in the negotiations and talks and thus formed the 
direction in their own desired way. The present situation with RoC within the Union 
makes this fact even clearer, where RoC has much leverage and power inside the EU and 
is able to veto undesired solutions. The Europeanization process in RoC has also been 
influenced much by the Europeanization process in Greece which will be dealt with next. 
EU influence on the Greek position  
The Greek and the Greek Cypriot relationship and positions are and have always been 
close. Cyprus has been perceived as a part of the Hellenic world, and thus almost part of 
Greece. For a long period of time, Greece supported the idea of enosis or unification of 
all Hellenic territory. However, this policy is not followed today. The early Greek line 
towards Cyprus’ EU membership was to reject all form of Turkish Cypriot involvement 
in the negotiations. If not, it would veto the whole upcoming enlargement round. It would 
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do the same thing if the application itself was rejected (Demetriou 2004b). As mentioned 
earlier, the result was a quick, three year period time, before the Commission made its 
opinion in 1993. Greece was also acting hard in 1995, during the Luxembourg Summit, 
when it threatened to veto the conclusion of the customs union with Turkey unless 
Cyprus was given a start date. It would be easier to veto this, than the whole enlargement, 
since Germany was in favor of the eastern enlargement (Dodd 2002).  
 Central in the Greek perception of the Cyprus conflict is the long lasting conflict 
between Greece and Turkey. The Greek position changed dramatically when the Simitis 
government came into office in 1996. His party, Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK), won the election and started the path for even greater integration into the EU. 
After the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999 a new paradigm of cooperative politics emerged 
in Greece (Rumelili 2004). There was a realization that unless Greece cooperated and 
coordinated its polities with the other EU countries, it would never enjoy the political 
advantages of being a member. Greece would also benefit from Europeanization inside of 
Turkey, were European values were going to be strengthened. Turkey’s geographical 
location is also an element here. Its location makes it an attractive ally of most of 
Greece’s allies. Greece opened up for a more inclusive policy towards Turkey and 
opened the door for future Turkish access negotiations. The Greek foreign minister, 
George Papandreu was one of the leading men for this new rapprochement policy (Tocci 
2003). Both Simitis and Papandreu were pragmatic persons who knew that better 
relations with Turkey were in Greek interests. 
 After years of crisis, stagnation, macroeconomic imbalance and populist politics, 
Greece is now emerging as a new state. In the past, Greece had no policy towards Turkey 
and they rejected all dialogue. This strategy was safe and did not expose them for much 
danger (Keridis 2001). There is a deep dislike in the Greek mind towards Turkey and 
Turks, since the Ottoman empire destroyed the Byzantine Empire, which was the 
repository of Greek civilization (Dodd 2002). Political discourse in Greece has 
traditionally emphasized Greek rights, rather than their interests.  If one are to emphasize 
ones interests, one have to use arguments and intelligent diplomacy. The relationship 
with Turkey, therefore, has been based on the references to rights rather than interests, 
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and thus makes bilateral diplomacy with Turkey almost impossible (Keridis 2001). This 
new state is also based on a stronger democracy with a more active civil society.  
 Greece was a strong supporter of the Annan Plan and settlement prior to the 
referendums (Tocci 2003, Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). Such a solution would be of great 
help for Turkey in their road toward EU membership. This shift towards cooperative 
politics in Greece especially favors the reconciliatory forces in RoC. 
 Stivachtis (2002) argue that Cyprus has a psychological and a symbolic value for 
Greece. Cyprus is also of strategic importance for Greece since it is located near the 
sensitive region of the Middle East and the Suez Canal. A country that exercises 
influence over such an island possesses significant geostrategic value that would allow it 
to increase its prestige and bargaining power within the international community 
(Stivachtis 2002). The island is also located near to the Turkish coast, and is therefore a 
“soft spot” for Turkey if Greece were to install large range weapons on the island.  
 Rumelili (2004) argue that the process of Europeanization has had a dualistic 
effect on Greece, where the traditional and the modern sections coexists. In the 1990s, 
Greece was criticized by the other member states both for the traditional way of doing 
politics and for a slow growing economy. This slowly Europeanization process has been 
explained with their culture. According to Rumelili, Greece is suffering from the 
“underdog culture”, an idea that the West is despising Greece because of its glorious past, 
which again restrains Greece from aligning its foreign policy with the EU foreign policy. 
They are therefore in constant search of protection. This lack of speed in the 
Europeanization process led to a crisis in the late 1990s when it became clear that Greece 
did not fulfill the conditions to join the monetary union (EMU). The joining in this 
cooperation became the national goal in Greece and led to large economic reforms, which 
also included abandoning the costly arms race with Turkey. 
 
EU influence on the Turkish Cypriot and the Turkish position 
There is a significant overlap between the TRNC official and Turkish national positions, 
as well as a long enduring tradition of mutual understanding and support among them. 
During the last decades, the national position on Cyprus has been institutionalized in 
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Turkey as “state policy”, and the majority of the Turkish people have supported former 
President Denktash and his struggle to defend the national identity of his people. 
 
EU influence on the Turkish Cypriot position  
 
 “The EU is an environment of peace, cooperation and compromise, so in the 
context of the EU the Cyprus problem could not survive within the EU if Turkey 
and Cyprus is going to be a member of the EU. Solution is a must.” (Interview, 
Turkish Cypriot politician,  2004) 
     
 “The EU is not solving the problem; it is becoming a part of the problem.” 
(Interview, Turkish Cypriot political  researcher,  2004) 
 
The Turkish Cypriot positions differ much from the Greek Cypriot and Greek position, 
even though the willingness to reach compromise has increased during the last years. As 
mentioned earlier, northern Cyprus has lived in isolation for over 40 years and as a result 
grown close ties to Turkey. The main stance towards RoC during these years has been the 
demand for equality with the Greek Cypriots and the presence of Turkish troops to 
preserve this (Brewin 2000). Traditionally, it has been the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey 
which have been blamed on after failed mediations. 
 The main Turkish Cypriot position of the application for EU membership in 1990 
was negative. The accession process had its strongest negative effects between 1993 and 
2001 (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). Tocci and Kovziridze (2004) argue that this was due 
to misinformation about EU and was therefore not valued enough. The information that 
did come was offer for manipulation by those who opposed to a solution. The Greek 
Cypriots on their side was sure that an EU membership would mean increased security, 
but it was harder to convince the north about this. Demilitarization would mean that the 
Greek Cypriot military dominance would be restored. Even though the EU had pointed 
out several opportunities for minority protection within the EU, the historical experience 
is difficult to overcome for the Turkish Cypriots. The tendency of the EU to avoid 
involvement in intra-state conflicts creates the perception of a security threat rather than a 
guarantee (Christou 2002). Further, it is claimed that both the Commission and the 
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Council showed little interest in their attitude towards the Turkish Cypriot side (Brewin 
2000). As mentioned earlier, the main incentive offered by the Commission was 
economic ones. However, the carrot had not the intended effect. The incentive was 
manipulated and labeled as bribe by Turkish Cypriot and Turkish officials (interview, 
Turkish Cypriot politician, 2004).  The decisions in 1995 to start the access 
negotiations made the relationship between TRNC and Turkey even stronger. The will to 
act open minded in settlement talks were absent, and the elections in 1998 showed a 
renewed support for Denktash and his line towards settlement (Dodd 2002). The south 
was then already doing harmonization work with the EU, something which only further 
alienated the north (Brewin 2000). The Turkish Cypriots were therefore loosing little 
when they announced that they would breach all contact with the EU in 1997. This was 
on the official level. On the unofficial level, there were meetings were the Turkish 
Cypriots tried to encourage the EU to be more balanced in their approach: 
 
“…we were telling them: listen, if you don’t approach this issue in a 
more balanced manner, the Greek Cypriots may surprise you. Although 
you think that the obstacle is the Turkish Cypriot regime, we believe that 
there is a greater problem within the Greek Cypriot community. I think 
the EU got this message very late. Of course the process of accession of 
the south could not been stopped at that point.” (Interview, Turkish 
Cypriot politician, 2004).  
 
The reaction from the EU was not what the Turkish Cypriots wanted:  
 
“They were saying that: “no, your government, your President and 
Turkey will never change, and your side will always block a settlement”. 
And we were telling them “listen, we are acting within people and we are 
seeing that pretty soon there will be a dramatic change within the 
Turkish Cypriot community”. But they could never believe that.” 
(interview, Turkish Cypriot politician,  2004). 
  
One important element in this negative approach was Rauf Denktash, who was President 
of TRNC from 1974 until April 2005. He was originally part of the coalition government 
from 1960 to 1963, when the Turkish Cypriots resigned from Parliament. Mr. Denktash 
insisted that if they were to join the negotiations, they would have to do it under the 
1960- Constitution, something that both the EU and RoC rejected. His official political 
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line was to have two separate states and that TRNC would move closer to Turkey in the 
same way as the south moved closer to the EU. TRNC signed several agreements with 
Turkey, mostly concerning economic cooperation, which again lead to further 
dependence on Turkey. TRNC are by some viewed as a “puppet state”, were more than 
50% of the budget is directly transferred from Turkey (interview, Turkish Cypriot 
professor, 2004). Economic decline in Turkey, as the one in 2000, had therefore huge 
impacts on TRNC economy. This again led to dissatisfaction with the local and the 
Turkish regime. The EU became then an important incentive to get out of this difficult 
situation. Because of tremendous pressure from Ankara, Denktash was sidelined and he 
withdrew from the UN negotiation process. He is seen by many as the player that did not 
play his cards right and thus lost the opportunity to get an agreement in time. Turkish 
Cypriots who had supported Denktash no longer shared his vision and organized large 
demonstrations in favor of settlement. These demonstrations sometimes gathered as many 
as 70 000 demonstrators and provided a new dynamic to the process (Barkey 2003). This 
mobilization of civil society can also be seen as an impact from the EU. The prospects of 
joining the Union were slowly changing their identity in opposition to their own 
government.  Seen from a different angle, Denktash had perhaps little choice in his 
actions. Northern Cyprus was unable to sell its agricultural products to Europe due to the 
embargo from 1994 and could only sustain its economic development through a parallel 
agreement with Turkey. Mr Denktash can, as well as Mr Papadopolous, be labeled as a 
securitizing actor (according to the theories of the Copenhagen School) because of his 
nationalistic rhetoric.  
 The Turkish Cypriot government hoped that the new settlement negotiations 
would delay the EU accession (Tocci 2003). However, in 1998 they were asked by the 
EU and the Greek Cypriots to appoint representatives for the negotiations, if they agreed 
on the 1990 membership application. The Turkish Cypriots as mentioned earlier rejected 
this invitation. There were also disagreements about what the Turkish Cypriots were to 
negotiate about if they were to join. Should they join to negotiate the accession of RoC? 
Therefore, all the 30 chapters regarding for instance economics, culture, tourism and 
infrastructure were based on the south and their economy progress and development and 
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not applicable to the north at all. The fact that they rejected to join the negotiations is still 
seen as a mistake (interview, Turkish Cypriot political researcher, 2004).  
 After the Helsinki Summit in 1999, rapprochement policy between Greece and 
Turkey was a fact and new settlement negotiations on both sides started. These 
negotiations lasted until February 2003 and did not succeed, and the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership was blamed for this.  By the autumn of 2002, both TRNC and Turkey realized 
that the accession of Cyprus into the EU was inevitable, and this further lead to a policy 
shift (Tocci 2003). The Turkish Cypriots understood that their hard line in criticizing 
RoC for their unilaterally accession was neither helping them nor the Turkish application.   
 A public opinion survey, made by the Commission in 2002 found that a high 
percentage of the people in northern Cyprus were supporting EU membership 
(Commission 2002a).  Nine in ten (88%) adults and teenagers thought that an EU 
membership would be a good thing for them, and 19% thought the opposite. The survey 
further showed that many of the inhabitants (77%) felt that they had a strong European 
identity, a share that is even larger than the EU members themselves (62%). “The Turkish 
Cypriots tend to see themselves as virtual Europeans even though they have very little 
contact with Europe directly. They see themselves as worthy Europeans.” (Interview, 
Turkish Cypriot Professor in Political Science, 2004). Of course, not having contact with 
the EU mythologizes the EU in the mind of the Turkish Cypriots. They think that they are 
European and that there should be no reason for them to be excluded and that their values 
are not in contradiction to the European values. However, not all Turkish Cypriots feel 
this way, because there is a strong ethnic identity as well, which in many times will 
override these cosmopolitan identities. This multi-layered identity of the Turkish 
Cypriots (and also the Greek Cypriots) can be explained with the use of constructivist 
institutionalist Europeanization theory. The domestic change happens though 
socialization which further develops new identities.  
 When analyzing EU involvement in the conflict, we see that the EU was mainly 
involved on the Greek Cypriots side (Demetriou 2004b). The situation has, however, 
changed to the more positive for the Turkish Cypriots. With the new leadership and the 
partial opening of the Green Line, the interest about an EU membership has grown. The 
change in leadership is also a consequence of the political change in Turkey which again 
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was heavily linked to the prospect of EU membership. However, the change in leadership 
came to late to impose any real impact to the settlement.  
 The increased pressure on Denktash in 2002 and 2003 from the EU had much 
impact on the Turkish Cypriot people in general. The parliamentary election in December 
2003 led to a victory for the opposition. Two opposing wings got the same amount of 
seats in the parliament, one of them opposing the Annan Plan and the other supporting it. 
The opposing side was the Democrat Party, led by Rauf Denktash’ son, Serdar Denktash, 
and the National Unity Party led by former Prime Minister Ergulu. The side who 
supported the settlement plan and EU membership was the Republican Party, led by 
Mehmet Ali Talat, and Peace and Democracy Movement led by Mustafa Akinci. The 
Republican Party and Democrat Party formed a coalition government and Talat became 
Prime Minister. The shift to a pro peace and pro EU government was a chock to the EU, 
according to the Turkish Cypriots (Interview, Turkish Cypriot politician, 2004). 
 The involvement of the Turkish Cypriots in Brussels altered after the 
referendums. After April 2004 a delegation from the government has visited Brussels 
frequently where they participate in the committee meetings as observers to watch over 
three legislations. One of them is direct trade; the other is direct funding the third is the 
Green Line regulations. This last regulation deals with the intra island trade. It is 
supposed to make it easier to produce things in the north, transport it to the south for 
documentation and then export it. However, with the RoC already inside the EU, they 
have been able to delay and block decisions concerning these three legislations, and none 
of them are therefore operational. The promises that the EU gave just before the 
accession in 2004 is no longer valid, since RoC and Greece now has got power to block 
and veto within the Council. The big debate is happening around the direct trade 
regulation, since this is the regulation that would help the TRNC economy the most, but 
also on the other hand indirect legitimize the state. If this regulation is approved, the ports 
and airport in the north would be legitimized in the eyes of the EU. The Turkish Cypriots 
would then be able to send goods to the EU without the heavy taxation and thereby 
compete with other EU members. This would again lead to a spillover effect and attract 
foreign investment and further economic growth in the north (interview, Turkish Cypriot 
politician, 2004)  
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 This development also fuels the negative feelings to the EU- antagonists, like the 
Democracy Party. They feel frustrated that the EU did not listen when they voiced their 
concern prior to the referendums.  
 
“EU had turned the blind eye and shut their eyes to our protest that “the 
way you are progressing you are going to have a divided island, you are 
going to have just the GC as your member and you will import a problem 
into the EU”. They would not listen. They thought,” we will put so much 
pressure on the TC and we get them to say yes to the solution of the 
Cyprus problem and the whole Cyprus will become member of the EU”. 
What they didn’t take into account was that the GC could say no. So I 
can not say we are very pleased with the EU.” (Interview, Turkish 
Cypriot political adviser, 2004). 
 
The negative view of the EU prior to the referendums did not change in these eyes after the 
referendums. With RoC inside the Union, they found the EU as “very heavy moving, slow 
moving, determined, has got powers but very reluctant to utilize them frequently” 
(interview, Turkish Cypriot political adviser, 2004). The general view of the EU after this 
is that is has been ineffectual and created a new situation that can help Denktash and his 
collaborators in his political vision which is by many viewed as ethnocentric and 
isolationist. 
 The EU demands more democracy in Northern Cyprus, but is at the same time 
undermining the institutions that is to promote the democracy (Interview, Turkish Cypriot 
political researcher, 2004). In their view, these institutions do not exist.  In the financial 
aid proposal from the EU there are no local authorities, just local bodies like the Camber 
of Commerce, which is elected by business men. “Will NGOs run the country? This is 
contradictions and dangers to developing democracy in the north”. (Interview, Turkish 
Cypriot political researcher, 2004).  
 EU impact on TRNC, seen from the EU official line, has and still is huge. 
However, this is in the long run and the only chance for the Turkish Cypriots to fully 
benefit from the EU is reunification. The EU rules and regulation try to make trade and 
economic issues as easy as possible, by lifting many of the barriers (interview, EU 
official, 2004). The main challenge for the Turkish Cypriots is to learn to use a tool 
which is not yet there, and to help them with this, the EU helps with technical assistance 
and information exchange through the so called TAIEX (Technical Assistance and 
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Information Exchange unit of Directorate-General Enlargement of the European 
Commission). Since the three regulations (direct trade, green line regulations and aid) are 
currently being delayed within the EU, the TAIEX is the only element which is active.  
  
EU influence on the Turkish position 
Turkey is holding one of the keys to this conflict, and the impact from the EU is clear to 
see, especially after 1999. The EU has leaded an active “carrot and stick” approach 
towards Turkey and their leadership, and views their application in direct connection with 
Turkey’s attitude towards the Cyprus conflict. 
 Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 and an associate member of the 
EU since 1963. 99% of its 71 million inhabitants are Muslims, but the country has been a 
different Muslim state than other states in the Middle- and Far East (Bundt 2004). As 
noted earlier, Kemalism as state ideology has as primary goal to integrate Turkey with 
Europe and the EU, and as a result of that, almost all governments from 1960 to present 
has urged for close cooperation with Europe and the EU in particular. However, during 
mid 1990s there was a shift in this traditional way of thinking. The left wing side in 
Turkey’s domestic politics, as well as the conservatives had a major drawback in the mid 
1990s. This political vacuum, mostly contributed by the military, favored the Muslim 
wing, and especially the Islamic party, Refah Partisi, RP. A growing part of the Turkish 
population was marginalized and poor because of the economic modernization and the 
RP party became soon the party for this segment of the population. They got 21, 5 % of 
the votes in 199512 and thereby the largest party in Turkey (Lange 1998). This was a 
historic moment in Turkey. RP formed a government in July 1996 with Mr. Erbakan as 
Prime Minister. He was skeptic about the modernization and relationship with the EU and 
preferred to turn to the Muslim world (Brewin 2000) Erbakan and his government 
became soon a threat to the military and their Kemalist way of thinking. Even though RP 
was not pushing any reforms or serious changes, the military forced them out of office in 
1997. The opposition party (ANAP) formed a government with Mr. Yilmaz as Prime 
Minister, and launched a massive pro-EU campaign in 1997.  
                                                 
12 7% in 1987 (Lange 1998).  
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 This Muslim shift in Turkish politics had effects in the rest of Europe. Even 
though the European view of Turkey had always been skeptic, it got even worse after the 
Islamist victory in both regional and national elections. As mentioned earlier, Turkey was 
denied candidate status during the Luxembourg Council meeting in 1997, and Prime 
Minister Yilmaz cut immediately all contact with EU. Ankara also threatened to annex 
TRNC if accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus went ahead. In understanding the 
Turkish reaction it is important to note that when Greece applied to join EU its economic 
and political fundamentals were also considered essentially unsuitable by EU member 
states. However, the Council decided that overriding political considerations required that 
Greece should accede. 
 After the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the intentions of the EU were to 
conduct a “carrot and stick policy” towards Turkey, which they considered the other part 
of the conflict, so they would resume the settlement talks with the RoC. This was much 
due to US pressure on the EU countries and Greece especially. Turkey is of vital geo-
strategic importance to the US, both regarded energy and foreign policy (Güney 2004).  
Prime Minister Ecevit then announced that his country only needed a few years to fulfill 
the Copenhagen criteria, but the EU, on the other hand, remained skeptical towards 
Turkey and suggests that it will take at least 10-15 years before the process of 
negotiations will even start. There are three main challenges for Turkey considering their 
EU application. The first one deals with the military and their strong power within 
politics, something that is not in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria. This scenario, 
would however, breach with the main principle in Kemalism. Second, the human rights 
situation in Turkey is questionable. The standards are not compatible with the EU 
standards, especially concerning the Kurds. According to the Lusanne Treaty from 1923, 
Jews, Armenians and Greeks are considered minorities, but the Kurds are not. The 
economic aspect is also a challenge for Turkey. They have a low GNP and high inflation, 
and there are great differences between different parts of Turkey considered the 
economy. The western part of the country has a relatively good economy with lots of 
industry, but the eastern and southern parts are almost at developing country level. It is 
the political and economical factors, which are of importance here, and not cultural or 
religious factors.  
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 After the 2002- election, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) formed a new 
government with Mr. Erdogan as the Prime Minister. The AKP refuses to define itself as 
a religious party, but rather a party that favor greater religious freedom.  They started a 
reform process in Turkey, a so-called “silent revolution” (Bundt 2004). These reforms are 
not easy to put to life, because of the intricate military-AKP relationship. The military, 
which is skeptical and negative to the AKP government, provide the government with as 
little maneuvering space as possible. Even though the reforms lack important elements, 
the EU commissioner for enlargement, Mr. Verhaugen, opens up for negotiation start 
during 2005. This process, however, are expected to last for many years both due to the 
situation in Turkey, but also because of the huge skepticism in Europe (especially in 
France, Germany and RoC). The military also lobbied actively against the governments 
wish for settlement in Cyprus and shielded Denktash from any type of pressure (Barkey 
2003). 
 The Europeanization has also created larger maneuvering space for the civil 
society in Turkey. Traditionally, the state has distrusted civil society and put restrictions 
on it, for instance through funding, organizations and the freedom of speech. This has 
further severely constrained the range of alternative identities and ideas. After the late 
1990s, however, the civil society gradually began to play an independent role in Turkey. 
This process was also further encouraged through the Civil Society Development 
Program, which was started by the Representation of the European Commission to 
Turkey. The program promotes and helps civil initiatives and increases the capacity of 
Turkish NGOs though technical support. Rumelili (2004) argues that even though this 
process was not initiated by the EU, it can help consolidate the efforts already made.  
 The theory of security complexes (Buzanet al. 1998) is suitable for explaining the 
difficulty of turning the Turkish society towards Europe. Central in this theory is the 
“insulator”, a border status that among others, Turkey holds. The fact that Turkey is such 
an insulator makes the whole environment around Turkey unstable. Researchers such as 
Diez (2004b) argue that there could be a danger in the fact that the peaceful European 
security complex is drawn into the conflicts of the Middle East, especially if Turkey 
becomes a member of the EU without changing their foreign policy. Turkey on its side is 
not strong enough to bring these two complexes together. Even though the theory is a 
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good device for explaining the key position of Turkey in the Cyprus conflict, there are 
some elements that make the theory less applicable here. Turkey is an unusual insulator 
in several ways: Turkey has for instance an unusual active foreign policy as an insulator. 
They have been active in several foreign policy actions in its neighborhood that can be 
labeled as desecuritization, much based on their Kemalist thinking of “peace at home, 
peace abroad” (Diez 2000b). For instance, they have been active in the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation Council and tried to build links between the Turkic countries of 
Central Asia and Caucasus. However, these activities can also bee seen as mere 
traditional foreign policy with pure national interests as goal. According to theory, an 
insulator is supposed to provide stability by preventing the security complexes to collide 
too much. In the case of Turkey, it would provide more stability inside the European 
security complex than outside as an insulator. Most important is that Turkey can no 
longer be seen as staying outside the European security complex.  
 The EU has great leverage to force states to resolve disputes by offering 
membership or threaten with sanctions to this status.  As mentioned above, the greatest 
impact from the EU was after the Helsinki Summit in 1999. From the history, we can see 
that states, for instance Greece and Turkey, has acted cautiously when the EU 
membership was pending and rather improved the bilateral relations rather than escalate 
the crisis. This “carrot and stick” approach failed before this for two reasons (Rumelili 
2004): One of the reasons given in the literature is that Turkeys application for 
membership came in a time period were the EU was conservative about its potential role 
in conflict resolution and rather ignored internal disputes. It especially kept out of the 
Greek- Turkish conflict and paid more attention at keeping both sides anchored in the 
West. Instead, the EU left the mediation and conflict resolution efforts to other actors as 
the UN, US or NATO. A second explanation is that the EU lost its ability to put any 
pressure on Greece, since Greece became a member in 1981. After this, Greece has had a 
dominant role within the Union and thus made the EU part of the problem. Turkey has 
viewed EU as just another forum in which Greece pursues its agenda towards Turkey. 
 Also present in Turkey is the so called “Sevres syndrome” a notion that the 
remaining world (especially the West) is constantly conspiring to weaken Turkey. This 
has again created sensitivity in Turkey with respect to equal treatment and recognition as 
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a Western country. The lack of democracy in Turkey and the difficult relationship 
between liberal democratic principles and the Kemalist ideology are also explanations to 
why the EU impact has not had full leverage in the past.    
 Turkey’s EU aspirations are contingent not only on Turkey doing the right thing 
by EU standard but also on US support. European doubts about Turkeys place in the EU, 
its large size, its different cultural roots, its economic backwardness, and troubled 
democratic tradition are sufficiently significant that the Europeans are likely to delay 
Turkey’s final accession.  
 
Summary 
In this chapter I have discussed the relationship between EU and the island of Cyprus. I 
have discussed several areas where the EU has imposed influence on the conflicting 
parties and how this influence can be explained. The EU supported the “Annan Plan” of 
the UN, but did not actively engage in the settlement efforts. However, it has influenced 
the various parts in different degree in different areas. The economic influence from the 
EU is perhaps greater on the RoC than it is for Northern Cyprus, but the political 
influence is easy to spot also in TRNC and also in Turkey. The EU uses “carrots and 
sticks” to transform economy and politics in candidate countries to make it more 
compatible to EU standards. This approach has worked and is still working in the case of 
TRNC and Turkey, even though the road to full membership can seem long and difficult. 
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6. Conclusion 
This case study has been focusing on the European Union and its relationship with the 
Cyprus conflict. Concerning this I have first examined the impact from the European 
Union on different actors in the conflict. These actors have been the Turkish Cypriots, 
Greek Cypriots, Greece and Turkey. Second, I have examined the reasons behind this 
influence. 
How has the EU influenced different parts of the Cyprus conflict? 
This analysis has shown that the EU impact on various actors in the Cyprus conflict has 
been complex. The involvement in the conflict came at a time were the EU had not yet 
consolidated itself as a political actor. The Cold War was barely over and the new 
political world was complex and difficult to maneuver within. It is therefore important to 
remember the context when analyzing the impact. The influence from the European 
Union on the conflict was both of positive and negative character; although I will 
conclude that the overall impact from the EU has not been positive. The EU actively 
supported the peace process but did not engage actively, and was actually reluctant all 
along to deal with the problem. Compared to the UN, the UK and even the US, the EU 
played a minor role. The most positive impact on the overall conflict is that the new 
mediation talks probably would not have happened if it were not for the accession of 
RoC. This opportunity gave all parts involved a new framework and platform on which 
they again could meet face to face.  
 The most positive impact is of natural reasons most obvious for the Greek and 
Greek Cypriot side. Greece strived for many years to include RoC into the EU and RoC 
itself has had both political and economical benefits from the access negotiation process 
and the membership, although the political impact has been the most prominent. The 
accession process boosted their leverage towards Turkey and also further ensured their 
own state as the only legitimate government on the island. It has also been political in the 
sense that the Greek Cypriots now feel secure under the EU security framework and that 
Turkey no longer is a threat. 
 EU pressure on Greece led eventually to a more positive shift in government and 
in policies towards Turkey. I think this is one of the most important positive impacts from 
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the EU, because the long lasting rivalry between Greece and Turkey has been one of the 
main reasons for the stalemate in the Cyprus conflict and a solution would imply a better 
relationship between these two countries. The capabilities of the EU to impose pressure 
and conditionality clearly worked in the case of Greece.  
 Due to this rapprochement policy, the EU could again offer a starting date on 
access negotiations for Turkey. Turkish accession process after 1999 has offered a more 
progressive attitude among the Turkish elite in order to improve their relations with the 
EU. They have improved their human right issues and democracy deficit, but EU officials 
claim that the road ahead for complete membership is long. Another impact is political 
and deals with government change, which happened in both Turkey and TRNC. The 
present Prime Minister Erdogan is, albeit his Muslim background, a propel for the 
Western direction in Turkeys politics. The western direction in (some parts of) the 
Turkish society has also contributed to greater openness and transparency in civil 
society.  
 The pressure on Turkey’s government further led to pressure to remove the old 
President and Euro-skeptics Rauf Denktash and make room for pro-peace and pro-EU 
parties in TRNC. The present President Mehmet Ali Talat is a close colleague of Erdogan 
and shares his vision of Turkey inside the EU. This shift was also due to a massive 
pressure within the TRNC public which did not agree on Denktash’s policies. The 
climate between the old governments in both TRNC and Turkey and EU has therefore not 
been positive in the past. I find it very important to maintain this positive climate in order 
to find a solution to the conflict in the future.  The impact from the EU on the Turkish 
Cypriot community has, because of the isolation and the embargo, been of little economic 
degree, but quite substantial concerning civil society and the government. Even though 
the direct influence from EU and Europe in general has been limited, the Turkish 
Cypriots nevertheless feel European and want to take part of the European project. The 
mass mobilization and demonstrations in protest to the government, shows that novel 
opening of the civil society which has been rare in TRNC in the past.  
 I will, however, stress one more positive impact of the EU on the different parts 
of the conflict. The more slow process of Europeanization through social learning is 
perhaps not obvious today, but can have much impact in the long run. It can help promote 
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a more pluralistic, democratic and tolerant society in the two communities on the island, 
in Turkey and continue the process already started in Greece.  
How can this influence be explained? 
The reasons for this diverse influence are various, and I will start with the context on the 
island itself, because I believe that the European Union (and the UN) did not take this 
enough into consideration. The two communities on the island have been de facto 
separated since the early 1960s and have not cooperated on political or economic issues 
since then. They have evolved in totally separate directions and their separation has led to 
growing fear and myths about one another. Their expectation about a solution has also 
varied from total separation to close federation, and to expect that they could cooperate in 
such a tight time frame is not likely. I also believe that the EU took the TRNC leadership 
and their intransigence as granted and did not pay enough attention to what was going 
on in the southern part. During the early 1990s it was the elites in both TRNC and 
Turkey that was regarded as the main hindrance to settlement. They did not spend enough 
time informing about the positive win-win situation of a settlement neither in the north 
nor in the south. 
 The EU strategies did also not reflect enough the Turkish Cypriot or the Turkish 
perceptions of the conflict, and therefore the EU could not gain leverage on the Cyprus 
issue. Neither Turkey nor TC perceived that the incentives offered by the EU outweighed 
their policy and interest on Cyprus. The economic carrot that was mainly used towards 
TRNC did not bear in mind their strong security concern, which outweighed the 
economic benefits of an EU- membership. Even if the carrot catalyst was not working as 
it was planned during the access negotiation phase, the Turkish Cypriots voiced a clear 
“yes” to reunification and EU-membership in the April 2004 referendum. It was therefore 
a positive catalyst in the sense that it promoted a new platform for debates and meetings.  
 After Greece became a member in 1981, the EU has not been viewed as a neutral 
or impartial arena for Turkey and TRNC. Before 1999, when Turkey got its candidate 
status, it was rather viewed as just another platform for their rivalry. With Greece safe 
inside the Union, the voice from the EU could not be perceived as impartial. After the 
Helsinki Summit when settlement was removed as a precondition for accession, the 
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impression of this has even increased. Today, both Greece and RoC are EU-members and 
makes the credibility of EU decisions even lower for the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots.  
 The European Union (and RoC) also failed to see the broader geo-strategic 
picture when posing the catalyzing effect on Turkey and TRNC. Turkey holds a special 
position as an “insulator”, and this forces it to have an active security and foreign policy 
in order to keep the different security complexes away from each other, but also in order 
to avoid isolation. However, it is argued here that Turkey is somehow an unusual 
insulator since it operates with a much more active foreign policy than the insulator 
position would imply.  Cyprus is of important geo-strategic value to Turkey, since it is 
located only 65 km from the southern coast of Turkey. The military presence in TRNC is 
not only there to protect the Turkish Cypriots, but also to protect Turkeys own coastline 
and only secure supply line. It is therefore impossible for Turkey to legitimize RoC and 
allow it to become under “Greek control”.   
 I have also argued that both rational integration theories and social constructivism 
can be used to explain the enlargement of Cyprus. Liberal intergovernmentalism is 
suitable to explain certain issues such as government- or state leader power. Neo-
functionalism can explain the ongoing integration with RoC, but it can not explain the 
integration of the whole island. This is because neo-functionalism stress the economic 
element in integration and that economic cooperation would eventually lead to political 
spillover as well. However, in ethnic conflicts, the argument of economic rationality does 
not have the intended effect. The “carrot catalyst” did not have the intended effect on the 
Turkish Cypriots as their view on other security issues was greater. I have also shown 
that social constructivism is a useful tool when explaining the integration of Turkey. The 
rational integration theories come short when explaining factors such as culture and 
identity.  
 
Looking into the future of Cyprus 
The future of Cyprus is heavily dependent on the future of Turkey. Certainly, a Turkey 
within Europe, with European values is the biggest guarantee of the Turkish Cypriots as 
well as meeting the Greek Cypriots security concerns. RoC is today in a position were 
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they can actively block decisions concerning Turkey and their future accession. If they do 
veto the Turkish accession start it would be bad for their own security concerns, but also 
for the entire European security concerns. I find the recent events in Europe, concerning 
the referendums on the European Constitution and the growing skepticism towards 
Turkey, as concerning. It can trigger a more Euro-skeptic attitude in Turkey which again 
can delay the possible settlement of the Cyprus conflict. Denying them access to the EU 
can make them turn towards east and further promote anti-Western ideology. If there is a 
uniformed opinion that Turkey ought to become a member of the EU, the pressure on the 
Greek Cypriot government would increase accordingly. It all depends on that. The key 
position that RoC holds can also become dangerous to the Turkish Cypriot population, if 
it comes to a point were Turkey and RoC bilaterally negotiate about the future. RoC can 
force Turkey into making concessions which for the Turkish Cypriot community can turn 
out as a semi-optimal solution. Turkey can for instance be forced to make concessions 
about the political equality and rights of the Turkish Cypriots, which since 1960 has been 
the rock bottom for the Turkish Cypriots. 
 For the integration of TRNC into the EU to become reality, it is also important 
that the TRNC community intensify their debates aimed at progressive political, social 
and economic change. They should also encourage open minded dialogue and friendship 
with the south to prevent further isolation. The Greek Cypriots on their side should do the 
same and initiate new talks and peace efforts. 
 The EU is, as stated previously not a uniform community but consist of many 
different voices. One can also hope that some of these voices can put pressure on the 
Greek Cypriot government to resume talks. The challenge will then be to transform the 
southern no-vote into a yes-vote while preserving the yes-vote in the north. It is therefore 
important that the EU increases its credibility and deliver what they have promised the 
Turkish Cypriot community.  
 To continue status quo is difficult for all sides in this conflict, and it is important 
that initiative is taken soon, not only to improve life for the Turkish Cypriots but also to 
make life easier to the Greek Cypriots. It is time to forget about the past and move on! 
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Appendix 
Interviews 
 
These are the persons I interviewed during the fieldwork in Cyprus in November 2004: 
 
• Political adviser for government party 
• Employee at the EU Commission representation office in Nicosia  
• Chair member of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. 
• Two Turkish Cypriot political researchers 
• One Greek Cypriot political researcher 
• Turkish Cypriot professor in political science at Eastern Mediterranean University 
• Two high ranking politicians for government party 
• Former Norwegian politician and researcher, now living in Cyprus 
• Seminar with a Greek Cypriot research organization. 
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